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ARTICLES
Normalizing Erie
Suzanna Sherry*

This Article argues that the Erie doctrine should be normalized by
bringing it into line with ordinary doctrines of federalism. Under ordinary
federalism doctrines-such as the dormant commerce clause, implied
preemption, federal preclusion law, and certain special "enclaves" of federal
common law courts will displace state law to protect federal interests even
when neither Congress nor the Constitution clcarly articulatesthose interests.
But undcr the Eric doctrine, the Supreme Court has mandated exactly the
opposite approach:state law trumps federal interests unless those interests have
been legislatively codified. This striking anomaly has not been noticed, in part
because the voluminous literatureon Erie has failed to recognize that the Erie
doctrine is a response to the same problem addressed by ordinary federalism
doctrines:In the absence of an explicit congressionalor constitutional directive,
how should courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction respond to clashes between
state law and unarticulated(that is, uncodified) federal interests?
This Article explains that Eric's unconventional answer to the problem
of unarticulatedfederal interests is a fluke of history. Pivotal decisions about
the Erie doctrine, unlike pivotal decisions about ordinaryfederalism doctrines,
occurred at a time of heightened concern about judicial overreaching. Those
concerns distorted the Court's decisionmaking, and Erie's response to the
common federalism question concequently diverged from ordinaryfederalism.
Recognizing and putting aside the distorting influence clears a path to reenvisioning the doctrine and replacing the current Erie analysis with the
familiar and established framework of ordinary federalism. Doing so
simultaneously brings Eric back into line with ordinaryfederalism, increases
judicial transparency,and resolves tensions within the existing Erie doctrine.
Herman 0. Loewenstein Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. I thank Erwin
Chemerinsky, Ed Cheng, Dan Farber, Brian Fitzpatrick, Barry Friedman, Michael Greve, Evan
Lee, Rob Mikos, Erin O'Hara O'Connor, Jim Pfander, Tom Rowe, Ganesh Sitaraman, Kevin Stack,
Jay Tidmarsh, and participants in thc Vanderbilt summer brown bag serice for helpful commonto
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INTRODUCTION

One of the central problems of American federalism is how
federal courts should treat state laws that conflict with federal
interests. The hardest aspect of that problem involves unarticulated
federal interests: situations in which neither Congress nor the
Constitution speaks clearly about whether or how federal interests
trump state laws. May courts nevertheless displace state laws in order
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to safeguard federal interests? The usual answer is yes. Ordinary
federalism doctrines establish a common framework to analyze the
conflict between state law and unarticulated federal interests. State
law is presumptively operative, but the presumption can be overcome
by a sufficiently strong unarticulated federal interest. If the
presumption is overcome, state law is displaced and federal law
governs. Ordinary federalism operates in many familiar doctrines,
including the dormant commerce clause, implied preemption, federal
preclusion law, and certain special "enclaves" of federal common law.
Oddly, however, there is one situation in which the Court has
reached the opposite conclusion, declaring that state law trumps federal
interests unless those interests have been legislatively codified. This
anomaly is commonly known as the Erie doctrine. Derived (some would
say loosely) from the 1938 case of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,1 the
doctrine has generated more than two hundred Supreme Court cases
and many thousands of scholarly articles. It has been called "the most
studied principle in American law." 2 Almost forty years ago, two
scholars noted that the Erie doctrine has "profoundly confused both
courts and commentators" since its inception.3 Matters have only gotten
worse since they wrote.
But despite the voluminous literature on Erie, no one has
recognized that the doctrine is actually a response to the same problem
of ordinary federalism: In the absence of an explicit congressional or
constitutional directive, 4 how should courts sitting in diversity
jurisdiction respond to clashes between state law and unarticulated
(that is, uncodified) federal interests? Rather than adopting a
rebuttable presumption in favor of state law, as ordinary federalism
does, black-letter Erie doctrine almost categorically prohibits judges
from applying uncodified federal law. This puzzling discrepancy
between the Erie doctrine and normal federalism has gone surprisingly
unnoticed and unexplained.

1. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2.
Peter Wcten & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is There Life for Eric After the Death of Diversity?,
78 Mici. L. REV. 311, 312 (1980). The doctrine has also bccn labeled "a star of the first magnitude
in the legal universe," BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 272 n.4
(1977), and an "icon," Craig Green, Repressing Erie's Myth, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 595, 595 (2008),
among othcr things. Ironically, given my argument in this Article that Erie is anomalous within
the world of federalism decisions, one scholar has called it "the gatekeeper of state law autonomy."
Richard D. Freer, Erie's Mid-Life Crisis, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1087, 1091 (1989). For the seminal article
on Erie, see John Hart Ely, The IrrepressibleMyth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693 (1974).
3.
Martin H. Redish & Carter G. Phillips, Erie and the Rules of Decision Act: In Search of
the AppropriateDilemma, 91 HARV. L. REV. 356, 357 (1977).
4.
The Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012), is not a directive to apply state law,
however much the Court may insist that it is. See text accompanying notes 36-40, infra.
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In this Article, I argue that it is time to normalize Erie. Erie's
unconventional answer to the problem of unarticulated federal
interests is a fluke of history. Pivotal decisions about the Erie doctrine,
unlike pivotal decisions about ordinary federalism doctrines, occurred
at a time when concerns about judicial overreaching-specifically
concerns about judicial interference with legislative prerogatives-were
front and center. Because of Erie's unique timing, these worries
distorted the Supreme Court's decisionmaking. The Erie Court's
response to a common federalism question consequently diverged from
ordinary federalism. Once we recognize and put aside the distorting
influence, we can re-envision the doctrine, replacing the current Erie
analysis with the familiar and established framework of ordinary
federalism. Doing so simultaneously brings Erie back into line with
ordinary federalism, increases judicial transparency, and resolves
tensions within the existing Erie doctrine.
I begin by explaining, in Part I, how Erie is anomalous. Part L.A
describes each of the ordinary federalism doctrines in turn, identifying
the common problem and the common solution. In the cases under each
of the four doctrines, the Court confronts a clash between state law and
unarticulated federal interests. The dormant commerce clause cases pit
state laws against the federal interest in the free flow of interstate
commerce. The implied preemption cases implicate a federal interest in
the full and effective implementation of federal statutes. Preclusion
doctrines address the federal interest in the reach and scope of federalcourt judgments. And the enclaves of federal common law encompass a
motley assortment of Court-identified federal interests. In each of these
situations, the Court solves the problem by using the same strategy of
ordinary federalism. The Court presumes that state law operates
normally. But if the state law interferes with articulated or
unarticulated federal interests, the presumption can be overcome and
federal law displaces state law.
Part I.B shows how the problem in Erie cases is analogous but
the solution is not. The use of state law in suits between citizens of
different states can sometimes clash with unarticulated federal
interests, for example an interest in an integrated national market for
consumer goods or an interest in the uniformity of federal litigation
rules. But the Erie doctrine essentially prohibits federal courts from
inquiring into those unarticulated interests. Instead of a rebuttable
presumption in favor of the operation of state law, the Erie doctrine
draws a sharp distinction between articulated and unarticulated
federal interests. If the federal interest has been codified, federal law
governs. Conversely, if the interest has not been codified, state law
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governs. 5 This formalist approach-an apparent limit on judicial
discretion-contrasts with the more pragmatic and functionalist
strategy of ordinary federalism, which gives judges the discretion to
evaluate the strength of unarticulated federal interests and the extent
of the state interference.
Part II turns to history to suggest that the contrast between
Erie's formalism and ordinary federalism's functionalism is not
coincidental. The doctrines of ordinary federalism were developed over
many years, and during that time the Court's primary focus was indeed
on federalism: the relationship between states and the federal
government. Concerns about judicial discretion or judicial overreaching
were very much in the background. The Erie doctrine, however, reached
a pivotal point of development during a period when those concerns
were in the foreground, and worries about judicial discretion were at
their height. The Court, blinded by these concerns, failed to recognize
the Erie problem as one of ordinary federalism.
Part II.A begins by tracing the history of concerns about judicial
overreaching. Mostly dormant or nonexistent for the Constitution's first
century or so, such concerns reached a crescendo during the first third
of the twentieth century. And it was just at that point that Erie made
its appearance.
I describe this Erie moment in Part II.B. For almost a hundred
years following Swift v. Tyson, 6 the Court expanded the reach of federal
common law. It is unsurprising that by 1938 the Court was ready to cut
back and allow more leeway for state law to apply. But the
jurisprudential forces that culminated in the momentous changes of
1937 and 1938-the end of the Lochner era of judicial resistance to

5.
Although there are nuances that in theory could allow federal law to govern in the
abocncc of codification and state law to govern even in ito prooence, both the baoic Eric doctrine
and its practical application yield the dichotomy I describe in the text. The dichotomy was formally
adopted in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). The Court held that if the federal interest has
been codified, it governs unless "the [Rules] Advisory Committee, this Court, and Congress erred
in their prima facie judgment that the Rule in question transgresses neither the terms of the
Enabling Act nor constitutional restrictions." Id. at 471. The Court has recently reiterated the
applicability of all Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that "regulate matters 'rationally capable of
classification as procedure.'" Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S.
393, 406 (2010). On the other hand, in the absence of codification, state law will govern unless the
difference between it and federal law is "nonsubstantial" or "trivial." Hanna, 380 U.S. at 467-68;
see also Ely, supra note 2; Richard A. Nagareda, The Litigation-ArbitrationDichotomy Meets the
Class Action, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1069, 1085-89 (2011); sources cited in note 110, infra.
6.
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
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Progressive legislation, as well as the Erie decision-were not focused
7
primarily on federalism.
The crucial jurisprudential dispute of the first third of the
twentieth century was instead about the power of the federal judiciary
in particular, not the power of the federal government in general.
Judicial overreaching was the culprit, regardless of whether that
overreaching took the form of increasing or decreasing the power of the
federal government (or, for that matter, of state governments) as a
whole. When the Court moved away from Swift, then, its new doctrine
rejected not only the perceived excesses of Swift, but also the perceived
excesses of the Lochner era.8 And Brandeis's Progressive politics further
exaggerated the (over)reaction to those excesses. Finally, the original
characterization of Erie as constitutionally mandated, combined with
the rapid accumulation of precedent, enshrined Erie's approach to such
an extent that later Courts-even those less concerned with limiting
judicial power-failed to notice it as anomalous.
Part II.C offers the contrasting history of ordinary federalism.
Although each of the doctrines developed differently-and each
continues to develop-none faced a crucial decision point at a time when
the Court was worried about judicial discretion or judicial overreaching.
Doctrines governing the dormant commerce clause, implied preemption
(especially obstacle preemption), preclusion, and the handful of
"enclaves" of federal common law all developed over relatively long
periods of time. This lengthy gestation allowed the Court to focus on the
changing nuances of the relationship between the federal and state
governments in general, without being distracted by a time-specific
concern with the role of the federal judiciary in particular.
Having described the existence and the origins of the disparity
between Erie and normal federalism, I turn in Part III to the normative
question. I argue that the Erie doctrine should be revised to align with
ordinary federalism doctrines. Doing so would create a more sensible
scheme for diversity cases and would close the gap between Erie and
7.
Indeed, the pre-1937 Court's insistence on the breadth of general federal common law
under the extant Swift doctrine was, from a federalism perspective, in sharp contrast to its
resistance to the federal New Deal. Thus the opponents of the old Court did not urge expanding or
contracting federal power vel non. For a similar description of thc Ncw Deal's jurisprudcntial
underpinnings (but made in service of a point opposite my own), scc Ernest A. Young, A General
Defense of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 10 J.L. ECON & POLY 17, 113-14 (2013).
8.
As Sam Issacharoff has put it, Erie represents the "triumph of the Progressive vision
against the hated ghost of Lochner." Samuel Issacharoff, FederalizedAmerica: Reflections on Erie
v. Tompkins and State-Based Regulation, 10 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 199, 217 (2013). Issacharoff views
this basic for Eric as an argument against implied preemption, scc id. at 219-22. I argue that it
instead reflects an undesirable distorting influence on the Court's decisionmaking in the
federalism context.
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kindred doctrines. More importantly, it would also force the Court to be
more transparent than it currently is in its accommodation of state and
federal interests. Under current doctrines, the Court can characterize
as doctrinally predetermined some decisions that in reality require a
discretionary choice between state and federal law. My proposed
realignment of the Erie doctrine would foreclose that sort of
masquerade. It would also align the Court's black-letter jurisprudence
with its actual decisionmaking.
Part IV briefly sketches the practical implications of normalizing
Erie. I outline what the Erie doctrine might look like without the
distorting effect of concerns about judicial power. This Part also
describes how a normalized Erie doctrine would resolve tensions within
the current Erie doctrine, in particular the recurring problem of how to
handle Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that conflict with substantive
state policies. The Article ends with a short Conclusion.
I. UNARTICULATED FEDERAL INTERESTS AND JUDICIAL POWER

A. OrdinaryFederalism
In a federal system, there will inevitably be situations in which
state and federal interests are at odds. Various provisions of the federal
Constitution-including, for example, the Supremacy Clause, the
Privileges and Immunities Clause, and a few others-explicitly prohibit
the states from acting in ways that interfere with certain federal
interests. But a constitution written for the ages is unlikely to account
for every clash between state law and federal interests. Indeed, even
detailed federal statutes may not foresee every possible problem created
by state actions. 9
So the question will always arise: If neither the Constitution nor
a federal statute speaks directly to whether a particular state action
interferes with federal interests, what should happen?
A few of the drafters of the Constitution suggested one answer,
but it was rejected. In the Federal Convention of 1787, James Madison
and Charles Pinckney several times proposed that Congress be given a
veto over all state laws "contravening" the Constitution, 10 or, more

9.
For an excellent discussion of why Congress is unlikely to be able to foresee and account
for such clashes in the text of statutes, see Daniel J. Meltzer, Preemption and Textualism, 112
MICH. L. REV. 1, 8-31 (2013).
10. See JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 31
(May 29) (Adrienne Koch ed., 1966) (the "Randolph Resolutions" or "Virginia Plan," almost
certainly drafted largely by Madison).
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broadly, "interfering in the opinion of the Legislature with the general
interests and harmony of the Union."11 Had the latter proposal been
adopted, the failure of Congress to veto a state law presented to it might
be taken to indicate congressional approval. But the veto was rejected,
and thus the question remained open whether congressional silence
should dispose of the matter, or whether, instead, the courts were free
to identify and protect federal interests left unarticulated by Congress.
The Supreme Court's definitive response across at least four
different doctrines has been that courts should protect unarticulated
federal interests. In each case, the decision to allow judicial protection
of the asserted interest was neither obvious nor constitutionally
mandated. But in each case the Court has decided-sensibly, in my
view-that a congressional failure to articulate or protect a particular
interest should not prevent the courts from identifying and protecting
that interest. Only in the context of Erie has it reached a different
conclusion. Examining each of the other doctrines in turn allows us to
see how Erie is anomalous.
1. The Dormant Commerce Clause
The most straightforward presentation of the question of
unarticulated federal interests arises in the context of the federal
interest in the free flow of interstate commerce. The Commerce Clause
gives Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce, but says
nothing about whether that power is exclusive-that is, whether (or
under what circumstances) the positive grant of power to Congress
implicitly deprives the states of authority to enact laws that regulate,
or that might impede, interstate commerce.
The dormant commerce clause doctrine represents the Court's
resolution of the issue. Under that doctrine, the courts are authorized
to strike down state laws that unduly burden the federal interest in
interstate commerce, even when Congress has not spoken.12 The most

11. Id. at 518 (August 23); see also id. at 88 (June 8). This proposal, suggested both times by
Pinckney and seconded by Madison, is broader because it is not limited to a veto over
unconstitutional laws. Despite Madison's original, narrower proposal, he probably preferred the
broader version. See ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM
149-50 (2010).

12. See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1971). In one sense, the dormant
commerce clauso doctrine is a double example of fcdcral courts protccting unarticulatcd intcrcsts.
Not only is explicit congressionalauthority for judicial action lacking, the Con3titution itsclf givcs
no toxtual indication of limits on state regulation of interstate commcrcc. As Richard Epstein (a
defender of the doctrine) puts it: "[A]s a matter of textual interpretation, [the] pedigree of the
dormant Commerce Clause is shaky at best," and it is "a judicial invention that is not easily
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important implication lies less in the imposition of implicit limits on
state authority and more in the affirmation of federal judicial authority
to step into the breach left by congressional inaction. Indeed, a handful
of objectors have suggested dismantling the entire doctrine on the
ground that it is a judicial usurpation of legislative authority. 13 The
principal importance of the dormant commerce clause doctrine for my
purposes, then, is that it establishes as a first principle that courts have
the authority to protect federal interests even when those interests are
14
unprotected or unarticulated by Congress.
2. Implied Preemption
Somewhat less obviously analogous is the federal interest in the
full and effective implementation of federal statutes. Congress, of
course, has the power to explicitly preempt state laws when acting
within its constitutionally prescribed authority.1 5 Again, the Court
could have chosen to take congressional silence-or lack of explicit
preemption-as dispositive. But it did not do so: black-letter federal
preemption doctrine reaches more broadly than invalidation of state
laws expressly preempted by federal statute. Instead, state laws are
preempted if Congress has completely occupied the field,1 6 if it is

defensible on narrow originalist grounds." RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASsIcAL LIBERAL
CONSTITUTION 228-29 (2014).
13. See, e.g., Dep't of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 361 (2008) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in judgment) ("[Tihe text of the Constitution makes clear that the Legislature-not the
Judiciary-bears the responsibility of curbing what it perceives as state regulatory burdens on
interstate commerce."); United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth.,
550 U.S. 330, 352 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) ("But the Constitution vests [the]
fundamentally legislative choice [between economic protectionism and the free market] in
Congress. To the extent that Congress does not exercise its authority to make that choice, the
Constitution does not limit the States' power to regulate commerce."); Steven Breker-Cooper, The
Commerce Clause: The Casefor JudicialNonintervention,69 OR.L. REV. 895 (1990). Justice Scalia
recently called the whole doctrine "a judicial fraud." Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne,
135 S. Ct. 1787, 1808 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
14. Note that Congress still has the last word. If it authorizes a particular state law, that
law doc3 not violate thc dormant commcrcc clauoec no matter how much it might impede interstate
commerce- cvcn ifthc Supreme Court has prcviously invalidated the rtato law under the dormant
commerce clause. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 423-25 (1946);
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855).
15. Whether that power derives from the Supremacy Clause or from Congress's other powers
is a subject of some debate. See, e.g., Stephen Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL
L. REV. 767 (1994); Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 Nw. U. L. REV.
727 (2008); Caleb Nelson, Preemption,86 VA. L. REV. 225 (2000). That debate is not relevant to my
thesis.
16. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
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physically impossible to comply with both state and federal law, 17 or if
the state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress."1 8 All three doctrines follow
roughly the same historical and jurisprudential pattern. Because the
last one, often labeled "purposes-and-objectives" or "obstacle"
preemption, provides the clearest parallel to both Erie and the other
doctrines I discuss, I focus on it.
Obstacle preemption-like the dormant commerce clausedepends on the underlying principle that the judiciary has the power to
determine whether state laws interfere with important federal interests
even when Congress has not explicitly articulated those interests. In
this context, Congress and the Court share the task of identifying the
federal interest at stake: Congress enacts the statute, but the Court
identifies the underlying objectives and insists on full implementation
even when Congress has not made its wishes clear. And it is the
judiciary that decides whether the state law in question is an
impediment to full implementation.
Opponents of the doctrine of obstacle preemption rely on
arguments that further demonstrate that the doctrine is a form of
protecting unarticulated interests, rather than simply an aspect of
ordinary statutory interpretation. Justice Thomas, for example, has
written trenchantly against this form of preemption, arguing that
under the doctrine, "the Court routinely invalidates state laws based on
perceived conflicts with broad federal policy objectives, legislative
history, or generalized notions of congressional purposes that are not
embodied within the text of federal law."19 For Justice Thomas, "implied
pre-emption doctrines that wander far from the statutory text are
inconsistent with the Constitution." 20 Similarly, some scholars suggest
that the doctrine of obstacle preemption should be replaced with a
doctrine based on "ordinary rules of statutory interpretation. ' 2 1 These
scholars implicitly assume that the current doctrine of obstacle
preemption is something other than ordinary statutory interpretation:
replacement would not be necessary if obstacle preemption were in fact
just an instance of statutory interpretation.

17. Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
18. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
19. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 583 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
20. Id.
21. Gardbaum, supra note 15, at 770. Other scholars have made similar suggestions. See,
e.g., Nelson, supra note 15, at 263-64, 276-90; Catherine M. Sharkey, Against Freewheeling,
Extratextual Obstacle Preemption, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 63 (2010); accord Issacharoff, supra
note 8, at 220; Merrill, supra note 15, at 729.
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3. Preclusion
Federal preclusion doctrines also raise an analogous question of
judicial power to protect unarticulated federal interests. Although it
seems obvious that there exists a federal interest in the preclusive effect
of federal-court judgments, Congress has never specifically articulated
either the interest or its contours. There is no federal statute governing
the preclusive effect of federal-court judgments. It has therefore been
up to the courts to create preclusion doctrines, and the Supreme Court
has done so. For both federal-question cases and diversity cases, the
Court has made clear that the preclusive effect of a federal judgment is
a question of federal common law. 22 Once again, the federal judiciary
has filled the gap left by congressional inaction, protecting federal
interests that Congress could have, but has not, addressed.
As with the dormant commerce clause and implied preemption,
the characterization of federal preclusion law as an instance of judicial
protection of unarticulated federal interests is bolstered by the
arguments of those who oppose the doctrine. One pair of commentators,
for example, criticized the Court's most recent preclusion case for its
failure to rely on any "specific act of Congress or ... provision of the
Constitution," as required by "Erie's condemnation of 'federal general
common law.' "23
4. Enclaves of Federal Common Law
Finally, the Supreme Court has identified a handful of diverse
situations in which judicially created federal common law displaces
state law. These "enclaves" demand the application of federal common
law, according to the Court, because they implicate "uniquely federal
interests. ' 24 Often viewed as exceptions to Erie, they are "well-

22.

See Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001). Some scholars have

included Semtck in thc list of cases establishing "enclaves" of federal common law, discussed in the
next subsection. See Jay Tidmarsh & Brian J. Murray, A Theory of Federal Common Law, 100 Nw.
U. L. REV. 585, 588 n.16 (2006). But in Semtek, the Court did not cite any of the other "enclave"
cases. It relied directly only on preclusion cases. It also mentioned Erie-to which the "enclave"
cases are sometimes considered an exception-only obliquely in two contexts: in rejecting an
intcrprctation of Rulc 11(b) as encompassing a rule of claim preclusion and in choosing to adopt
state rules of preclusion as the default federal rules (in the absence of a countervailing federal
interest). This citation pattern suggests that the Court did not think of Semtek as an "enclave"
case.
23. Earl C. Dudley, Jr. & George Rutherglen, Deforming the Federal Rules: An Essay on
What's Wrong with the Recent Erie Decisions, 92 VA. L. REV. 707, 725-26 (2006).
24. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988) (quoting Tex. Indus., Inc. v.
Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981)). Two scholars have recently traced the term
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established and stable pockets of federal common law." 25 They include
disputes between states, 26 cases affecting the rights and obligations of
the United States, 27 admiralty cases, 28 cases affecting foreign
relations, 29 and cases affecting government contractors. 30 Many
scholars have noted the inconsistency between the Erie doctrine and the
existence of these enclaves. Scholars have either urged the elimination
of some (or all) of the enclaves or tried to justify them on historical,
structural, or textual grounds. 31 But the lesson here should be that it is
the Erie doctrine that is the outlier, not the existence of isolated
instances of judicial power to protect unarticulated federal interests.
B. Erie's Exceptionalism
By now, readers should see the pattern: when Congress has
authority to act but has failed to do so, the courts have stepped in to
identify and protect federal interests. What is less obvious is that the
Erie doctrine raises the same question of judicial power, even though
the Court treats it as something entirely different.32
"enclaves" to Banco Nacional de Cuba v.Sabbatino,376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964), and have identified
six enclaves. See Tidmarsh & Murray, supra note 22, at 588 n.16. For the classic argument
reconciling Eric and those enclaves of common law, sce Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Eric and
of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 388-90 (1964).
25. Tidmarsh & Murray, supra note 22.
26. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
27. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979); Clearfield Tr. Co. v. United
States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
28. Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731 (1961).
29. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 376 U.S. 398.
30. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
31. See, e.g., Bradford R Clark, Federal Common Law: A StructuralReinterpretation,144 U.
PA. L. REV. 1245 (1996); Caleb Nelson, The Legitimacy of (Some) Federal Common Law, 101 VA. L.
REV. 1 (2015); Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law, PoliticalLegitimacy, and the Interpretive
Process:An "Institutionalist"
Perspective, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 761 (1989); Adam N. Steinman, What
Is the Erie Doctrine? (And What Does it Mean for the Contemporary Politics of Judicial
Federalism?),84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245 (2008); Tidmarsh & Murray, supra note 22; Ernest A.
Young, Preemptionand Federal Common Law, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1639 (2008).
32.
Scholars, too, have ignored the commonalities between, on the one hand, run-of-the-mill
Erie cases, and, on the other, cases involving preemption, the dormant commerce clause, federal
preclusion law, or the "enclaves" of federal common law. See, e.g., Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the
Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2098-99 (2000). Dinh describes a spectrum of situations in
which federal law "preempts" state law; the spectrum runs from clear congressional action,
through less clear congressional action, to congressional inaction. He includc3 on thi3 3pcctrum
various forms of preemption, the dormant commerce clause, and federal common law enclaves as
exemplified by Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988). He does not discuss Erie.
His discussion is broader than most, in the sense that it links preemption with both the dormant
commerce clause and federal common law but it is typical in itsomission of the Eric doctrinc. One
commentator has recently noted in passing the similarity between what he labels "difficult" Eric
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It is sometimes supposed that the Erie doctrine is the answer to
a unique question that arises solely because of the existence of diversity
jurisdiction. Justice Frankfurter helped foster that view early on, when
he wrote that a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction "is ...in
effect, only another court of the State."33 Justice Brandeis's opinion in
Erie was considerably broader, identifying the limits on federal judicial
power as simply one aspect of limits on federal power generally. The
constitutional error of Swift v. Tyson, 34 which required its overruling,
was that it conferred on federal courts "the power to declare rules of
decision which Congress was confessedly without power to enact as
35
statutes."
But there is another way to look at the question answered (in
different ways) by both Swift and Erie, one that is simultaneously
broader than Frankfurter's and narrower than Brandeis's: What is the
role of the judiciary in furthering national policies and national
interests that have not been specifically addressed by federal statutes?
Looking at the question in this way demonstrates that it is neither a
general issue of federal power nor unique to Erie. It is, in fact, the same
question raised and answered by the ordinary federalism cases just
discussed. The Court, however, does not view it that way.
The Erie doctrine and its predecessor under Swift both concern
the source of the governing substantive law in cases in which federal
court jurisdiction is based on the diverse citizenship of the parties. 36 The

caoco and "difficult" preemption cases. Adam N, Steinman, Our Clacc Action Federalism:Erie and
the Rules EnablingAct After Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1131, 1169 (2011). His analogy
islimited to Eric casc in which a federal positive law edsts but "is silent on the ultimate question
of how that piece of federal law relates to potentially overlapping stato law." Id. Ho thur focueo
on interpretive questions about the scope of the federal interest articulated in the law'c text, rather
than on unarticulated federal interests. Another recent commentator makes essentially the came
move, with 3omcwhat greater detail, as a way to explain the Court's inconsistent precedent when
a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure is at issue. Jeffrey L. Rensberger, Erie and Preemption:Killing
One Bird with Two Stones, 90 IND. L.J. 1591 (2015).
33. Guaranty Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945); see also Van Dusen v. Barrack,
376 U.S. 612, 642 43 (1964) (holding that transfer from a federal court in which a diversity caco
is properly filed to another federal court does not change the obligation to apply the choice of law
doctrines of the state in which the case was originally filed, because transfer does not "effect a
change of law but [is] essentially only ...a change of courtrooms").
34. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
35. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72 (1938); see also id. at 78 ("Congress has no power
to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a state ... [a]nd no clause in the
Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts.").
36. The doctrine also applies to state-law claims brought into federal court under
supplemental jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Nothing in my argument turns on whether
the source of jurisdiction is § 1332 or § 1367, so for simplicity's sake I refer to Erie as a rule for
diversity cases.
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crux of the problem in both Swift and Erie is that Congress has never
clearly specified the law to be applied in diversity cases. The Rules of
Decision Act 37 does not fit the bill. The Court adopted one meaning of
that Act in Swift then the opposite meaning in Erie, and may well have
been wrong both times (from the perspective of both the original
legislative intent and the original public meaning of the language of the
Act). 38 The first Congress, in 1789, enacted both the Rules of Decision
Act and the first statute authorizing diversity jurisdiction. The grant of
diversity jurisdiction was based primarily on fears that state courts
would be insufficiently attentive to the federal interest in a national
economy. 39 Thus the two acts taken together suggest an implicit
congressional articulation of some federal interest; 40 at the very least,
the Rules of Decision Act cannot be interpreted as an explicit denial of
any federal interest in the substantive law to be applied in diversity
cases.

37. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012). In its current form (which diverges only trivially from the
original 1789 language), it reads: 'The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or
treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded
ac rules of dooicion in civil actions in the courts of the United Statc, in cacs3 where they apply."
38. On the incorrectness of the statutory interpretation, see Martha A. Field, Sources of Law:
The Scope of FederalCommon Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 903-04 (1986); Friendly, supra,note 24,
at 388-90; Caleb Nelson, A Critical Guide to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 54 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 921, 954-56 (2013) and sources cited therein; and Suzanna Sherry, Wrong, Out of Step, and
Pernicious:Erie as tho Worst Decision of All Time, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1291 133 37 (2011), and sources
cited therein. For a recent defense of the Court's interpretation, sec Young, supra note 7, at 2545. For more classic arguments that the Rules of Decision Act places significant limitations on
federal court lawmaking in diversity cases (and disputes about the underlying policy behind tho3c
limitations), oeo Ely, supra note 2 (avoiding forum shopping and consequent unfairness); Redish
& Phillips, eupra note 3, at 357 (federalism); and Weston & Lehman, supra note 2 (avoiding
unfairness).
39. See Robert L. Jones, Finishinga FriendlyArgument: The Jury and the HistoricalOrigins
of Diversity Jurisdiction,82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 997, 1010-17 (2007); Patrick J. Borchers, The Origins
of Diversity Jurisdiction,the Rise of Legal Positivism, and a Brave New World for Eric and Klaxon,
72 TEX. L. REV. 79, 86-98 (1993); Wythe Holt, 'To EstablishJustice": Politics,the JudiciaryAct of
1789, and the Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 DuKE L.J. 1421; Henry J. Friendly, The
HistoricBasis of Diversity Jurisdiction,41 HARV. L. REV. 483 (1928); see also David Marcus, Erie,
the Class Action FairnessAct, and Some FederalismImplications ofDiversity Jurisdiction,48 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1247, 1265-70 (2007) (collecting sources).
40. Scholars dispute whether the mere statutory grant of jurisdiction ought to be taken as a
congressional. authorization for judicial lawmaking in cases within that grant. See, e.g., Green,
supra note 2, at 609-10 (yes); Field, supra note 38, at 915-19 (yes, although Erie rejects this
possibility); Borchers, supra note 39, at 98 (maybe); Steinman, supra note 31, at 316 (no). I do not
take Bides in this argument; rather, I suggest that no statutory authorization is necessary, as the
courts should be able to protect unarticulatcd federal interests. The contemporaneous enactment
of the Rule. of Decision Act and the grant of diversity jurisdiction remove any argument that there
ic a codified prohibition on judicial protection of unarticulated federal interests in the context of
diversity.
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In the absence of an explicit federal statute, the question of the
source of law in diversity cases thus raises exactly the same question as
the other three doctrines discussed here: May the judiciary determine
whether the particular case implicates federal interests unarticulated
by Congress, and, if so, may it create and apply federal common-law
doctrines 4 1 to protect those interests? The Court's answer in Erie is
firmly negative. Federal courts must apply state law, not federal, unless
the federal interest has been codified in either a statute or a Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure. 42 That approach is flatly inconsistent with the
approach taken under ordinary federalism doctrines, and the Court has
never addressed either the analogy or the inconsistency.
Reconceiving the key question in Erie and its progeny in this
way sheds light on the doctrine, but it also creates a previously
unnoticed puzzle. Why has the Court so steadfastly eschewed judicial
protection of unarticulated federal interests in only this one context? I
suggest that history provides the answer. The Erie doctrine-and only
that doctrine-developed against a background of concerns about
judicial overreaching, which distorted the Court's focus. The next
Section of this Article elaborates my claim.
II. THE ORIGINS OF ERIE'S EXCEPTIONALISM
A. The Rise and Fall of Concerns About JudicialOverreaching
Concerns about judicial authority are necessarily intertwined
with jurisprudential views of what it is that judges do. In eras in which
judges are thought to find, rather than make, law, there will be less
concern that judges might trespass on legislative prerogatives. In eras
in which judges are viewed as partisan or political lawmakers, there
will be more such concern. The concern, in short, will rise and fall in
concert with the amount of discretion judges are believed to exercise.
My thesis is that the Erie doctrine, unlike the other doctrines,
was influenced by the Court's concerns about judicial overreaching.
That thesis necessarily rests on jurisprudential history, but requires
only a broad overview of the eras of American jurisprudence. In
particular, I focus on the dominant jurisprudence of each age as an

41. By describing doctrines as "common law," I mean only that it is fashioned by judges
without recourse to any particular written source. I do not intend to wade into the controversy
about the many possible meanings of the term. See Nelson, supra note 31, at 10-18.
42. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); Burlington N. R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1
(1987); Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988) (statutes); see also sources cited in
note 110, infra. There are a handful of exceptions, which makes the usual Erie rule all the more
anomalous. See text accompanying notes 24-31, supra, and 191-216, infra.
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indicator of judicial views. In this Section, I therefore paint with broad
strokes, ignoring many nuances and attempting to provide a relatively
uncontroversial description of each era.
Judicial power in the abstract was not especially controversial
in the early republic. Particular rulings were ignored, challenged,
criticized, or overruled, but the authority of the judiciary itself was not
seriously questioned. For example, despite some contemporaneous
criticism of the Supreme Court's substantive mandamus holding in
Marbury v. Madison,43 the decision itself was largely uncontroversial.
Marbury's affirmation of the power of judicial review, in particular,
garnered little criticism. 44 During the first few decades after Marbury,
the only major dispute about judicial review was a debate about
45
federalism rather than separation of powers.
Why such complacency about the judiciary? Serious concern
about judicial overreaching is unlikely as long as judges (and citizens)
believe-or at least claim to believe-that they have little or no
discretion. And so it was when the Constitution was adopted and for
more than a hundred years afterward, through two related
jurisprudential eras.
Before and after 1789, and continuing through at least the first
three decades of the nineteenth century, natural law jurisprudence
dominated American judicial thought. Both state and federal courts
invalidated statutes based on inconsistency with unwritten natural
law, sometimes in addition to, but sometimes instead of, a narrow
reliance on written constitutions. 46 Law was found, not made, by judges,

43.

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

44.
See, e.g., WILLIAM E. NELSON, MARBURY V. MADISON: THE ORIGINS AND LEGACY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW 72 (2000); ROBERT LOWRY CLINTON, MARBURY V. MADISON AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
102 (1989); HOWARD E. DEAN. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND DEMOCRACY 27 (1966); 1 CHARLES WARREN,
THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 248 (1923); Michael J. Kiarman, How Great Were
the "Great"Marshall Court Decisions?, 87 VA. L. REV. 1111 (2001).
45.
See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Why We Need More JudicialActivism, in CONSTITUTIONALISM,
EXECUTIVE POWER, AND THE SPIRIT OF MODERATION 11, 12-13 (George Arishidze et al. eds., 2016):

Few objected to federal judges reviewing the constitutionality of federal statutes or
state judges reviewing the constitutionality of state statutes. But federal judges
reviewing the federal constitutionality of state statutes? That was a problem. It was,
however, merely one aspect of the larger issue of federal power in general; objections to
federal judicial interference with state prerogatives were no louder than objections to
federal legislative or executive interference with state prerogatives. From Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee through John Calhoun's interposition and nullification theories to the
Civil War, states periodically resisted all federal claims of supremacy.
See also Daniel A. Farber, Judicial Reniew and Its Alternatines: An Ameriran Tale, 38 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 415 (2003).

46. See Suzanna Sherry, Natural Law in the States, 61 CIN. L. REV. 171 (1992); Suzanna
Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127 (1987).
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even if they had a hand in shaping it. Law was, in Oliver Wendell
Holmes's classic disparaging description a century later, a "brooding
omnipresence in the sky." 47 Whether this natural law was thought to
spring up from customs (or existing positive law) or descend from reason
(or God), it placed serious enough constraints on judicial discretion to
allay most concerns about judicial 'lawmaking." 48 As Larry Kramer has
described the difference between that view and the modern one:
"Common law adjudication has an element of creativity in both worlds,
as bound closely to the
but the earlier view sees this creative element
49
service of exogenously fixed principles."
The Marshall Court encouraged the public belief in judges as law
finders rather than lawmakers. The Court drew a distinction between
law and politics, identifying the former as the domain of the judiciary
and the latter as the domain of the other branches. 50 And even as the
Court made new law, it denied doing so. As perhaps the foremost
historian of the Marshall Court has put it:
[T]he process of recasting doctrine often meant its modification to conform to new
conditions, but the recast doctrines were treated as if they were enduring principles that
had been extracted from the authorities of the past. Just as the Court did not treat its
recasting of the Constitution as making new law, it did not treat its recasting of common
or doctrine were
law doctrines as lawmaking. In both areas modifications of language
51
presented as the promulgation and clarification of settled principles.

Thus, whether because of an actual belief in the existence of natural
law or because of tactics that reduced public opposition to the exercise
of judicial discretion, early nineteenth century judges remained
relatively untroubled by concerns about judicial overreaching.
As the century progressed, the prevailing jurisprudence changed
but the underlying principles that protected judges from doubts about
their own authority did not. Natural law jurisprudence morphed into
classical formalism, but jurists continued to believe that judges could
remain aloof from politics. Classical formalism shared with natural law
47. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
48. On the differences among these various sources of unwritten law, see, e.g., Henry Paul
Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 776-77 (2010); Nelson, supra
note 38, at 981 37; and Stephen A. Siegel, Historism in Late Nineteenth Century Constitutional
Thought, 1990 WISC. L. REV. 1431, 1540-43. The classic description of the development of the
Anglo-American idea of a "higher" law is EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF

AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1955) (reprinting two 1928 Harvard Law Review articles).
49. Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts, 12 PACE L. REV. 263, 282
(1992).
50. See, e.g., William E. Nelson, The Eighteenth Century Background of John Mfarshall's
ConstitutionalJurisprudence,76 MICH. L. REV. 893, 935-36 (1978).
51.

G. EDWARD WHITE, 3-4 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE

MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-1835, at 9 (1988).
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jurisprudence both a denial that judges made law52 and techniques that
claimed to cabin judicial discretion. Law was viewed as "built on a
bedrock of scientifically deducible principles," 53 and governed by
"identifiable bright-line boundaries that judges could apply to a case
without the exercise of will or discretion." 54 The law declared by judges,
in other words "was not an arbitrary creation." 55
During both eras, then, judges believed (or at least claimed to
believe) that adjudication was apolitical and therefore that judicial
authority should not be troubling. As Morton Horwitz has noted, "until
very late in the nineteenth century, categorical modes of thought made
it possible for jurists to believe that there could be a form of neutral
legal reasoning that was fundamentally different from political
56
reasoning."
All that changed by 1938. The timing-and the abruptness of the
transition-is somewhat disputed, 57 but there is no dispute about the
jurisprudence that replaced formalism. Oliver Wendell Holmes spoke
for the emerging (but not yet dominant) new view when he declared in
1917:
Ours is not a closed system of existing precedent. The law is not such a formal system at
all.... We legitimately made the law in question and we can unmake it. Courts must
make law. Indeed, courts are major policy makers in our system of government. 58

52.

See, e.g., N.E.H. HULL, ROSCOE POUND AND KARL LLEWELLYN: SEARCHING FOR AN

AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 34 (1997) (suggesting that "the very nature of the formalist argument"
was that "law was discovered, not made").
53.
NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 23 (1995); see also HULL, supra
note 52, at 3-15.
54.
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE CRISIS

OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 18 (1992); see also Robert Post, Federalism in the Taft Court Era: Can It Be
"Revived'?, 51 DUKE L.J. 1513, 1592-93, 1637-38 (2002) (noting that during 1920s, the Court

identified common law, more than the legislature, with "the people," and deocribing the Taft
Court's "understanding of itself as the authoritative voice of a deep public morality that
transcended more trancient democratic will"); Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudenceand
the American Constitutional Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1, 24 (1991) (describing American
jurisprudence from the Founding through the Lochner era as "conceptual conotitutionalism":
"Constitutional law's operative concepts... must be given to, not chosen by, the Courts. Judges
were to discover and disclose these basic concepts ....Constitutional law's basic norms were not
the product of judicial will and policymaking").
55. Siegel, supra note 48, at 1437.
56. HORWITZ, supranote 54, at 27.
57.
For somewhat different descriptions of the transition, see DUXBURY, supra note 53;
HORWITZ, supra note 54; EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE
CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN
TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA (2000); and Siegel, supra note 54.
58.

S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). In charting the

move from natural law through formalism to Realism and positivism, I am not claiming that
positivicm drove Erie or that Swift wee incompatible with positivism. My point is simply that with
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The first three decades of the twentieth century-often called the
Lochner era after the case that "crystallized" the attacks on formalism
and "brought Progressive Legal Thought into being" 9-ended the longin
running fiction that judges were neutral finders of the law. Realism
60
jurisprudence.
American
prevailing
its various forms became the
Once some version of the Realist view of judges as lawmakers
spread to judges themselves, the jig was up. With the advent of Realism,
"the judge is moved decisively from the wings to the centre-stage of
American jurisprudence."6 1 Now judges had to worry about whether
they were illegitimately trespassing on legislative or popular authority.
And worry they did, helped along by the political furor over the
Supreme Court's conservative rulings against Progressive and New
Deal reforms. The decades-long battle between Progressives and
conservatives on the political front, and between Realists and classical
formalists on the jurisprudential front,6 2 culminated in the momentous
Supreme Court about-face in 1937. The Court for the first time upheld
crucial parts of the New Deal and similar state legislation, 63 and a year
later conspicuously announced its withdrawal from serious scrutiny of
legislation, at least where economic regulation was at issue. 64 For the
next few years, the Court remained sensitive to concerns about judicial
overreaching.
But beginning in the early 1940s, "the judiciary receded from the
center of national politics." 6 5 As one prominent commentator has put it,
Realism and positivism came a new concern about judicial overreaching. For recent scholarship
persuasively challenging the conventional connection between Erie and positivism, see Jack
Goldsmith & Steven Walt, Erie and the Irrelevanceof Legal Positivism, 84 VA. L. REV. 673 (1998);
Michael Steven Green, Law's DarkMatter, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 845 (2013); and Stephen Walt,
Before the Jurisprudential Turn: Corbin and the Mid-Century Opposition to Erie, 2 WASH. U.
JURIS. REV. 75 (2010).
59. HORWITZ, supra note 54, at 36, 33. The reference is to Lochner v.New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905).
60. Another, intersecting, trend contributed to the historical pattern of complacency
gradually giving way to concern: during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, "[a]s
the Supreme Court became increasingly activo and its decioions increasingly far roaching, largor
numbers of Americans grew concerned about the nature of its decisions and the legitimacy of its
expanding role." Edward A. Purcelli Jr, Democracy, the Constitution, and Legal Positivism in
America: Lessons from a Winding and Troubled History, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1457, 1500 (2014).
61. DUXBURY, supra note 53, at 51.
62. Note that neither pair of opposition groups completely overlapped: Not all Progressives
were Rcaliot3, and vice versa; not all formalisto were conoervativoo, and vice versa. See generally
DUXBURY,supra note 53; HORWITZ, supra note 54.
63. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); W. Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
64. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
65. PURCELL, supra note 57, at 38.
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"[t]he age that gave rise to the Erie decision was ending as the decision
was issued" in 1938.66 A confluence of factors played a role in the decline
of concerns about judicial overreaching. As a practical matter, concerns
were lessened by the Court's acquiescence in the New Deal, the
withering of Progressivism in the face of the Cold War, and political
realignments that eliminated the Court as a "common enemy. ' '67 On a
more theoretical front, various forms of process theory and consensus
theory edged out Realism as the dominant jurisprudence. By the late
1950s, the Supreme Court once again felt confident enough to declare
itself the ultimate arbiter of the Constitution.6 8 Judicial assertions that
concerns about intrusion on legislative or popular prerogatives
warranted judicial modesty, while still occasionally heard, did not
return in force until very late in the twentieth century.
What this brief romp through American jurisprudential history
should demonstrate is that (until quite recently) concerns about judicial
overreaching did not exert much influence on the Supreme Court except
during the short period between 1937 and the early 1940s. As I show in
the next two sections, only the Erie doctrine hit a pivotal point of
development during that period, and thus only the Erie doctrine was
influenced by those concerns. That historical fortuity distorted the
Court's focus and caused the Erie doctrine to veer off in a direction
opposite that of the other doctrines raising the same question.
B. The Erie Moment
As every first-year law student learns, in 1842 the Court in Swift
v. Tyson 69 held that federal courts did not need to follow state common
law in diversity cases unless the case involved a question of "local"
rather than "general" law. The Court interpreted the Rules of Decision
Act directive that "the laws of the several states ... shall be regarded
as rules of decision" 70 as limited to "the positive statutes of the state" or
"local usages." 71 In all other cases, the federal courts were obligated to
ascertain for themselves the "just rule" dictated by "general principles

66.
(2001).
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Susan Bandes, Erie and the History of the One True Federalism, 110 YALE L.J. 829, 849
See PURCELL, supra note 57, at 37-38, 197-99, 227.
See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012).
Swift, 41 U.S. at 18-19.
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and doctrines. '72 In other words, federal courts were to develop and
apply a federal common law except where local interests predominated.
Swift was more exemplary than unusual. If anything, it
represents a nineteenth-century low point for judicial protection of
federal interests in diversity cases. As historical analyses have shown,
the 1789 Rules of Decision Act was probably meant to give federal
courts the power to establish and apply federal common law in all
federal cases absent a federal statute, including cases in which states
had enacted statutory law. 73 And federal courts began to create federal
common law almost immediately.7 4 When Swift interpreted the Act to
distinguish between state statutory law (which federal courts were to
apply) and state common law (which federal courts need not apply
unless it implicated purely "local" interests), it was in one sense a
limitation on federal judicial power.
If Swift was a low point, it was also a turning point. Beginning
as early as 1847-a mere five years after Swift-the Court began to
expand the reach of general federal common law. In that year the Court
decided Rowan v. Runnels, 75 in which it refused to follow Mississippi
Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Mississippi Constitution.
Instead, the Court adhered to its own prior interpretation of the
before the
Mississippi Constitution, reached in a case decided
76
definitively.
spoken
had
Court
Mississippi Supreme
72. Id. at 19.
73. See sources cited in note 38, supra.
74. See generally William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the
JudiciaryAct of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513 (1984); James
Wcinatcin, The Federal Common Law Origins of Judicial Jurisdiction:Implications for Modern
Doctrine,90 VA. L. REV. 169 (2004); Kristin A. Collins, "A ConsiderableSurgical Operation":Article
III, Equity, and Judge-Made Law in the Federal Courts, 60 DuKE L.J. 249 (2010). The exceptions
were cases involving purely "local law"-in other words, cases in which there was little or no
federal interest. See Fletcher, supra, at 1531-38.
75. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 134 (1847).
76. The timing is a bit unclear. In Green v. Robinson, 6 Miss. (5 Howard) 80 (1840), the
Mi6issippi High Court of Errors and Appeals interpreted the Mississippi constitution to prohibit
the sale of slaves. In Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449 (1841), the Supreme Court
interpreted the same clause of the Mississippi constitution as not prohibiting the sale of slaves.
Counsel for Groves (seeking to void the contract for sale) referred to Green, 40 U.S. at 461-62, but
counsel for Slaughter argued that "[t]he decisione of the courts of the otate of MisGiosippi have
'
been contradictory and the construction of the relevant provisions "has not been conclusively
settled," Id. at 480. The Court, in discusing "whether there ha boon -uch a fixed and settled
construction given to the [Mississippi] constitution as to preclude this Court from considering it
an open question," did not mention Green at all. See id. at 497-98. Given the difficulty of obtaining
state court records at that time, it is possible that the Court overlooked Green despite counsel's
reference. In Rowan, the Court, noting that Groves had been decided early in 1841, described
Groves as resting on the fact that at the time "the construction of the clause in question had not
been settled either way, by judicial decision, in the courts of the State." 46 U.S. at 139. But by the
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During the second half of the nineteenth century, the Court
chipped away at Swift's limitations. It continued the pattern, set in
Rowan, of ignoring state constitutional rulings. It first announced in
1864 that it was not bound by "every... oscillation" in state-court
interpretations, leaving it free to pick and choose whether to follow the
state court's most recent decision.7 7 It then relied on such "oscillations"
even when there were none, or when the latest state ruling had occurred
long before the events giving rise to the lawsuit before the Court.7 8 By
1874, it abandoned the fiction of "oscillations," refusing to follow
consistent Michigan Supreme Court rulings on the ground that they
were not sufficiently persuasive.7 9 Nine years later, the Court held that
it had a "duty" to apply its own "independent judgment" in state
80
constitutional cases.
The Court similarly imposed its own views of state statutory
law. In 1894, for example, it refused to follow the Wisconsin Supreme
Court's interpretation of a Wisconsin statute, declaring that "we think
we are at liberty, and perhaps required ...to interpret this statute for
ourselves."8 1 As legal historian Carl Swisher described it, the Court
"began to challenge not merely state court interpretations of the
common law, but also state statutes violating principles or practices in
which the Court believed."8 2 And although in theory the Court's
authority to apply federal common law was limited, under Swift, to
general rather than local law, by the turn of the twentieth century
"general" law included vast swaths of the common law.8 3 In 1910, a case
Lini( of Rowan, thu Mississippi couits had dcfinitivcly sluk. gee, c.g., Cutton v.BMien, 6 Rob.
115, 116 (La. 1843) (referring to the apparently unreported 1843 Mississippi case of Brien v.
Williamoon as one of "several" decisions holding the sale of slaves unconstitutional). The Rowan
Cmrt,insisted or, Alpiiid,ig by Groves anyway "Ajig iwdpr th,,
opinion thus de-.libt-.ru ly giui l,y
tbig curt, wQ esn ha'rdly be requiire'd, hy Sny rornity or roQpQn for th_ St'fqft
co,,rfq, terrender
our judgment to decisions since made in the State." 46 U.S. at 139.
77. Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 68 U.S. 175, 205-06 (1864).
78. See, e.g., City v. Lamson, 76 U.S. 477 (1870), discussed in CHARLES FAIRMAN, 6 HISTORY
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1028-31 (1971).

79.
80.
81.

Pine Grove v. Talcott, 86 U.S. 666, 677 (1874).
Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U.S. 20, 35 (1883).
Metcalf v. Watertown, 153 U.S. 671, 678-79 (1894).

82.

CARL B. SWISHER, 5 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE TANEY

PERIOD 1836-64, at 333 (1974).
83.
See Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 370-71 (1893) and cases cited therein;
RANDALL BRIDWELL & RALPH WHITTEN, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COMMON LAW: THE DECLINE
OF THE DOCTRINES OF SEPARATION OF POWERS AND FEDERALISM 119-22 (1977); TONY FREYER,
HARMONY AND DISSONANCE: THE SWIFT AND ERIE CASES IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM 71 (1981);

PURCELL, supra note 57, at 51 63; Bradford R. Clrk, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of
Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1413-14 (2001); Lawrence Lessig, Erie-Effects of Volume 110:
An Essay on Context in Interpretive Theory, 110 HARV.L. REV. 1785, 1972 (1997).
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involving the quintessentially local question of the 4sale of real estate
was held to implicate general rather than local law.
Summarizing and criticizing some of these developments,
Justice Field wrote in 1893 (in a passage later prominently quoted in
Erie):
I am aware that what has been termed the general law of the country-which is often
little less than what the judge advancing the doctrine thinks at the time should be the
general law on a particular subject-has been often advanced in judicial opinions of this
court to control a conflicting law of a state. I admit that learned judges have fallen into
as a convenient mode of brushing aside the law of a
the habit of repeating this doctrine
85
state in conflict with their views.

Field's doubts about the soundness of Swift were echoed by later
Justices, including, most famously, Justice Holmes (joined by Justices
White and McKenna in 1910, and Justices Brandeis and Stone in
1928).86
In 19382, the dissenters garnered enough votes to overrule Swift
altogether. In Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,8 7 the Court by a 5-3 vote
(Justice Cardozo not participating) reinterpreted the Rules of Decision
Act to include both state statutes and state common law. The majority
relied on both the "defects" of the Swift doctrine and a new historical
theory of the Act.8 8 In a part of Justice Brandeis's opinion joined by only
three of the other seven Justices, he also concluded that the "course
pursued" under Swift was unconstitutional as an invasion of "rights...
reserved by the Constitution to the several States." 9 Thenceforth,
federal courts would be out of the business of declaring general federal
common law.
The Erie doctrine quickly became deeply entrenched in layers of
precedent. Immediately after the decision, the Court began to apply
Erie with a vengeance. Less than a month after Erie, the Court vacated
and remanded a decision in an insurance-law case in which the lower
court had actually concluded that state law applied; the Court reasoned
that "a different case might have been presented, and the facts and

84. Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 361 (1910); see also Williamson v. Berry, 49
U.S. (8 How.) 495, 543 (1850) (refusing to follow a New York court's interpretation of a private
statute on the disposition of an estate, because it was "no part of local law"). The Court eventually
changed its mind on Williamson. See Suydam v. Williamson, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 427 (1861).
85. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 149 U.S. at 401 (Field, J., dissenting).
86. See Kuhn, 215 U.S. at 370-72 (Holmes, J., dissenting); Black & White Taxicab & Transfer
Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 532-36 (1928) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
87. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
88. Id. at 72-73, 74-78.
89. Id. at 78, 80.
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authorities developed in another fashion, if the parties had had in mind
from the first" that state law necessarily applied. 90 Two more insurance
cases were remanded for the application of state law two weeks later. 91
By the end of the term two more cases had been granted certiorari,
92
reversed, and remanded with instructions to apply state law.
Even more significant, within a little over a decade, the Court
decided at least thirteen major cases-addressing fifteen different
important questions-clarifying and elaborating Erie. (That the
doctrine needed so much clarification suggests just how
groundbreaking the decision was. 93)
One set of questions involved how far the doctrine reached. In
late 1938, the Court extended the principles of Erie to law pronounced
by territorial courts. 94 In 1945, it held that Erie applied to both law and
equity. 95 In two other cases, by contrast, the Court limited the reach of
the doctrine and confirmed that pre-Erie law still applied. In 1942, the
Court ruled that Erie had not altered the basic principles of preemption
law: state rules of estoppel do not apply if they would thwart federal
antitrust law. 96 Four years later the Court held that federal bankruptcy
courts were similarly not bound by Erie to apply state law in
"determining what claims are allowable and how a debtor's assets shall
97
be distributed."
A second set of questions arose in the context of the post-Erie
need to identify and apply state law. In 1940, the Court ruled that in
the absence of a ruling by the state's highest court, a federal court
90. Ruhlin v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 202, 208 (1938).
91. N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 304 U.S. 261 (1938); Rosenthal v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 304
U.S. 263 (1938).
92. Hudson v. Moonier, 304 U.S. 397 (1938); Mut. Benefit, Health & Accident Ass'n v.
Bowman, 304 U.S. 549 (1938).
93.

Cf. ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: A STUDY OF A CRISIS

IN AMERICAN POWER POLITICS 272 (1941) (calling Erie "the most remarkable decision of the [1938190] poriod and in some respects one of the most remarkable in the Court'3 history"); acc alao
Nelson, supra note 38, at 922 (quoting contemporaneous commentators describing Erie as
"transcendently significant," a "thunderclap," and "dramatic"). By the end of the 1950 Term, the
Court had citod Eric in roventy cases, only six of which were unadorncd mentions.
94. Waialua Agric. Co. v. Christian, 305 U.S. 91 (1938). The Court acknowledged that the
Rules of Decision Act did not technically apply, but rcaooned that "thc arguments of policy in favor
of having the state courts declare the law of the state are applicable to the que3tion of whether or
not territorial courts should declare the law of the territories." Id. at 109. The Court did not quite
make Erie fully applicable, suggesting that federal courts could override local law of territorial
courte when there is "a clear departure from ordinary legal principles." Id.
95.
Guaranty Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). The Court had indicated as much,
in dicta, a few weekl after Erie See Ruhlinj 304 U.S. at 205.
96. Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942).
97. Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 162 (1946).
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should follow state intermediate court rulings "unless it is convinced by
other persuasive data that the highest court of the state would decide
otherwise."98 Shortly afterward, the Court made clear that federal
courts could not abdicate their responsibility to decide issues of state
law even under conditions of uncertainty. 99 In 1941, the Court held that
a federal court of appeals should reverse a district court decision that
was a correct application of state law at the time it was issued, if, before
the court of appeals' ruling, the state supreme court changed the law by
overruling the cases on which the district court had relied. 100 Later that
year, the Court specified which state's law should apply, directing the
federal court to use the choice-of-law doctrines of the state in which it
sits.101 And in 1943, the Court first announced the rule-which it
implicitly overruled in 1991-that it would ordinarily defer to district
102
court determinations of the content of state law.
Finally, in six cases between 1939 and 1949 the Court grappled
with a problem that has continued to bedevil federal courts ever since.
Although Erie directs federal courts to apply state substantive law,
10 3
federal procedural law still governs in federal court proceedings.
These six cases each raised the question whether a particular disputed
rule was substantive or procedural, and in each one a divided Court
held it to be substantive and therefore applied state law. 104 For a decade

98. West v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237 (1945); accord Six Cos. of Cal. v. Joint
Highway Dist., 311 U.S. 180, 188 (1945); Fidelity Union Tr. Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169, 177-78
(1945). The same obligation does not run to decisions of all state lower courts. See King v. Order
of United Commercial Travelers of Am., 333 U.S. 153, 159-61 (1948).
99. Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943); accord Williams v. Green Bay &
W. R.R. Co., 326 U.S. 549, 553-54 (1946).
100. Vandenbark v. Owens-Ill. Glass Co., 311 U.S. 538 (1941).
101. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); accord Griffin v. McCoach, 313
U.S. 498 (1941).
102. Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 118 (1943). Courts of appeals generally also deferred
to district courts, but in Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225 (1991), the Supreme Court
held that they should decide questions of state law de novo.
103. See, e.g., Guaranty Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 107-08 (1945).
101. The six cases involved (1) state rules on burden of proof, Citiec Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap,
308 U.S. 208 (1939) (unanimous); (2) state rule- on accrual of the cause of action, West v. American
Telephone & Telegraph Co., 311 U.S. 223 (1940) (unanimous on this holding); (3) state statutes of
limitations, Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y., 326 U.S. 99 (majority opinion by Justice Frankfurter;
Justices Rutledge and Murphy dissented), (4) state rules governing whether the statute of
limitations was tolled by the filing of a complaint or only by its service, Ragan v. Merchants
Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949) (majority opinion by Justice Frankfurter; Justice
Rutledge dissented); (5) a state rule that required certain plaintiffs to post a bond before bringing
suit because under state law they would be liable for attorneys' fees if unsuccessful, Cohen v.
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (majority opinion by Justice Jackson;
Justices Douglas, Frankfurter and Rutledge dissented); and (6) a state rule that an unregistered
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after Erie, then, the Court applied it aggressively. As Justice Rutledge
put it in dissent in 1949:
I think [these] decisions taken together demonstrate the extreme extent to which the
Court is going in submitting the control of diversity litigation in the federal courts to the
states ....What is being applied is a gloss on the Erie rule, not the rule itself.... Mhe
Erie case made no ruling that in so deciding diversity cases a federal court is "merely
another court of the state in which it sits," and hence that in every situation in which the
105
doors of state courts are closed to a suitor, so must be also those of the federal courts.

The Court continued to decide, and to be divided by, more Erie
questions, but this first decade is enough for my purpn.qes By the time
the Court confronted the next truly significant Erie question in 1965,
the Erie doctrine was so entrenched as to be immune from serious
examination.
Two additional factors furthered that entrenchment. First, that
the Erie decision rested in part on constitutional grounds gave it a
gravitas that counseled against backpedaling. Second, leading up to
Erie and for at least several years afterward, judge-made state law was
viewed by Progressives as more favorable to Progressive goals than was
judge-made federal law.10 6 The New Deal Court was therefore naturally
led toward application of state rather than federal law in a variety of
circumstances.
The entrenchment of Erie meant that even after the concerns
that triggered it faded, it remained invulnerable. That invulnerability
led the Court to elaborate the doctrine in ways that limited judicial
authority.
Erie and its immediate progeny, in holding that in the absence
of a federal directive to the contrary federal courts must always follow
state substantive law, rested on an implied assumption that the
judiciary lacked power to protect unarticulated federal interests. 107
corporation could not bring suit in state court, Woods v.IntcrotatcRcalty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949)
(majority opinion by Justice Douglas; Justices Jackson, Rutlcdgc and Burton dissentcd).
105. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 558 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
106. See generally PURCELL, supra note 57, at 141-64.
107. One case in 1958 suggested that federal interests might sometimes outweigh Erie's
commuaiid, although thc CumIt alu piovided othi giounda fut its devisivi. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge
Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958). The suggestion in Byrd has borne no fruit: as John Hart
Ely recognized early on, "[T]here is no place in the [Court's post-1965] analysis for the sort of
balancing of federal and state interests cortmplated by the Byrd opinion." Ely, eupra note 2, at
717 n 130, More recently, one procedure casebook noted that "[tihe Court has rarely cited Byrd
since it was decided, and never unequivocally for the proposition that a countervailing federal
ijUrest overcomes" an E,iedetviurinatiuii that state law should apply. TiOiIAs D. ROWE, JR. ET
AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 611 (4th ed. 2016). Another scholar suggested that it has been "all but
ignored in subsequent developments." Allan R. Stein, Eric and Court Acces3, 100 YALE L.J. 1935,
1954 (1991). On the other hand, some scholars have argued that some form of Byrd balancing is
actually the best explanation of the caselaw. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont, Rcvcrsc Erie, 82 NOTRE
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That assumption was not questioned during the period of precedentbuilding that immediately followed Erie.
In 1965, the Court made the assumption explicit. In Hanna v.
Plumer,10 8 the Court bifurcated the analysis of vertical choice-of-law
questions; that bifurcation still governs today. If Congress-directly by
statute or indirectly through the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-has
codified the federal interest, then Erie is irrelevant and federal courts
should apply the (codified) federal rule. This part of Hanna'sholding is
essentially similar to a form of express preemption, as commentators
have recognized. 10 9 But if Congress has not codified the federal interest,
then Erie applies with full force.
Thus, ironically, the Erie doctrine cleaves preemption into its
two halves, requiring courts to apply doctrines of express preemption
and prohibiting them from applying doctrines of implied preemption.
Indeed, one prominent scholar views Ianna as an embodiment of the
very distinction between codified and uncodified federal interests that
the Court has rejected in other contexts. 110 The combination of Erie and
Hanna thus crystallizes the Court's rejection, in this one context, of the
more usual judicial authority to protect unarticulated federal interests.
As this Section has shown, then, the doctrine governing the law
to be applied in diversity cases in federal courts took pivotal turns at
two points. First, in the mid-nineteenth century, the Court began to
expand the reach of general federal common law. Then, in 1938, with
DAME L. REV. 1, 14-17 (2006); Donald L. Doernberg, The Unseen Track of Erie Railroa& Why
History and JurisprudenceSuggest a More StraightforwardForm of Erie Analysis, 109 W. VA. L.
REV. 611 (2007); Richard D. Freer & Thomas C. Arthur, The IrrepressibleInfluence of Byrd, 44
CREIGHTON L. REV. 61 (2010). Even if that is true-and I am not persuaded that it is-the blackletter law is to the contrary. See, e.g., Wendy Collins Perdue, The Sources and Scope of Federal
ProceduralCommon Law: Some Reflections on Erie and Gasperini, 46 KAN. L. REV. 751, 756 (1998)
("[T]he Court appears to vacillate between the balancing tet of Byrd and the modified outcome
tot of Ianna [and] [t]heoe two tests arc largely inconointont,"); Steinman, oupra note 31, at 267
69 (suggesting that a rccent cane cannot be read as endorsing Byrd, despite the arguments of somo
commentators).
108. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
109. See, e.g., Clermont, supra note 107, at 43-44.
110. See Clark, supra note 83, at 1419-22; see also Allan Erbsen, Erie's Four Functions:
Reframing Choice of Law in Federal Courts, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 579, 635-37 (2013)
(identifying the Court's focus on the "pedigree" of the federal law a a puzzle); Nelson, supra note
31, at 4 ("[C]ourts can recognize federal common law only on topics that something in written
federal law implicitly or explicitly puts beyond the reach of the states' lawmaking powers.");
Kcrmit Rooerelt III, Choice of Law in Fcderal Courto;From Erie and Klaxon to CAFA and Shady
Grove, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 35-36 (2012) (stating federal law gets "differential treatment...
depcnding on it3 source"; "judge made law gets treated differently"). Another way of looking at it
i3 to sugge3t that unless Congreon nayn otherwise, "it in asnumed that there are no substantive
federal policies being furthered in the adjudication of a diversity case." Martin H. Redish,
Continuing the Erie Debate: A Response to Westen and Lehman, 78 MICH. L. REV. 959, 969 (1980).
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Erie, the Court contracted that reach. The first development occurred
as a gradual accretion, as one might expect when one views the question
as purely one of federalism. But the contraction was different: it was a
complete, full-throated denial of federal judicial power to protect
unarticulated federal interests, rather than some attempt to better
accommodate both federal and state interests. Why was the Court so
adamant? Because the contraction took place in 1938, at the height of
the Supreme Court majority's concern with judicial overreaching. The
Court's worries about judicial authority distorted its view of the
federalism question before it. And by the time those worries had time
to fade, the Court had piled so much precedent on top of Erie that there
was no turning back.
There is a final irony in the disconnect between Erie and
ordinary federalism. Twelve years before Erie,Justice Brandeis himself
struck a broad stroke in favor of protecting unarticulated federal
interests in the context of preemption. In Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line
Railroad Co.,"' Brandeis's opinion for a unanimous Court created a
little-known corner of field preemption. Napier established for the first
time that Congress's mere delegation of broad authority to a federal
agency can be construed as an intent to occupy the field--even if there
is no other evidence of that intent, and even if the agency has issued no
regulations relating to the subject of the challenged state law.1 1 2 In a
letter to Frankfurter, Brandeis defended Napieras a way to ensure that
federal interests could not be superseded unless Congress "expressly
provided" for the preservation of state interests.1 1 3 Brandeis's
endorsement of judicial protection of unarticulated federal interests
could hardly be broader. But in Erie, Brandeis and the Court were
distracted by a preoccupation with extraneous matters. The next
Section examines how ordinary federalism developed in the absence of
that distraction.
C. OrdinaryTimes Produce OrdinaryFederalism
The timing of Erie contrasts with the development of the
ordinary doctrines of federalism. In this Section, I canvass the history
of the dormant commerce clause, implied preemption, federal
preclusion law, and the enclaves of federal common law. Each of these
doctrines developed over a long period of time, and none hit a pivotal
111. 272 U.S. 605 (1926).
112. See id. at 613.
113. "HALF

BROTHER,

HALF

SON":

THE LETT"ERS

OF

Louis D.

BRANDEIS

TO

FELIX

FRANKFURTER 263 (Melvin I. Urofsky & David W. Levy eds., 1991). I thank my colleague Jim Rossi
for alerting me to both Napier and Brandeis's letter.
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point during the immediate post-1937 era. Thus the doctrines were
shaped by considerations of federalism undistorted by worries about
judicial discretion or judicial overreaching. It is the absence of those
worries that makes them ordinary. Unsurprisingly, in the absence of a
distorting influence the Court ended up solving these four similar
problems in similar ways.
1. The Dormant Commerce Clause
The doctrinal development of the dormant commerce clause
spans almost two centuries. Dormant commerce clause jurisprudence
traces its roots to Chief Justice John Marshall's opinion in Gibbons v.
Ogden in 1824, in which the Court first discussed whether
congressional power under the Constitution's Commerce Clause should
be regarded as exclusive or concurrent. 114 The facts of Gibbons are
familiar: Ogden sought to enjoin Gibbons from navigating interstate
waters pursuant to Ogden's exclusive right to do so under an act of the
New York legislature. 115 Although the Court expressly reserved
judgment on the question whether the states might regulate commerce
in the absence of congressional action,1 1 6 both Marshall's majority
suggested
opinion and Justice Johnson's concurring opinion strongly
11 7
exclusive.
was
commerce
over
power
that congressional
In dicta, Marshall also suggested possible exceptions to the
exclusivity of federal authority. Certain state laws with an effect on
interstate commerce might nevertheless be constitutional if they were
enacted pursuant to the traditional police powers vested in the states.1 1 8
Thus, although the Court in Gibbons did not directly address the
contours of the dormant commerce clause, it laid important

114. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
115. Id. at 7.
116. Id. at 197-98; 200 ("In discussing the question, whether this power is still in the
States ... we may dismiss from it the inquiry, whether it is surrendered by the mere grant to
Congress, or is retained until Congress shall exercise the power ... because it has been exercised,
and the regulations which Congress deemed it proper to make, are now in full operation.").
117. Id. at 209 ("It has been contended by the counsel for the appellant, that, as the word 'to
regulate' implies in its nature, full power over the thing to be regulated, it excludes, necessarily,
the action of all others that would perform the same operation on the same thing.... There is
great force in this argument, and the Court is not satisfied that it has been refuted."); id. at 227
(Johnon, J., concurring) ('The power of a sovereign state over commerce, therefore, amounts to
nothing more than a power to limit and restrain it at pleasure. And sinoo the power to prescribe
the limits to its freedom, necessarily implies the power to determine what shall remain
unrestrained, it follows, that the power must be exclusive.").
118. Id. at 203-04.

1190

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:5:1161

groundwork. As one scholar put it, Gibbons represents a "tentative but
unconsummated embrace of the Dormant Commerce Clause. 1 19
Four years later, the Court tackled the issue again and again
endorsed both the exclusivity of Congress's commerce power and the
constitutionality of state laws with incidental effects on interstate
commerce so long as they were rooted in traditional state police powers.
Applying these principles in Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 120
the Court upheld the challenged state law on narrow grounds. Willson,
a federally licensed sloop operator, intentionally broke through a dam
built by Black Bird Creek Marsh Company across Black Bird Creek, a
small but navigable creek in Delaware.1 2 1 Construction of the dam in
question was authorized by a provision of the Company's charter, which
had been granted by the Delaware legislature.1 22 Willson challenged the
trial court's judgment finding him liable for trespass, arguing that the
Delaware statute granting the Company permission to construct the
dam on navigable waters was an unconstitutional regulation of
interstate commerce. 123 After noting that the Delaware legislation had
been promulgated pursuant to traditional police powers-to increase
the value of property adjacent to the creek and to improve the public
health-Marshall's opinion for a unanimous Court disposed of the issue
in a single sentence: "We do not think that the act empowering the
Black Bird Creek Marsh Company to place a dam across the creek, can,
under all the circumstances of the case, be considered as repugnant to
the power to regulate commerce in its dormant state, or as being in
conflict with any law passed on the subject.' 24
For the next two decades, the Court formally adhered to the
principle that while Congress had exclusive power to regulate interstate
commerce, the states could nevertheless use their police powers in ways
that incidentally affected that commerce. The unanimity of Gibbons
and Black Bird Creek, however, evaporated quickly. Justice Story
dissented when the Court upheld state regulations (as it did in Mayor
of the City of New York v. Miln1 25 ), arguing that the state could not
exercise its police powers through means that affected interstate
commerce. 126 Chief Justice Taney, on the other hand, dissented when
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Norman R. Williams, Gibbons, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1398, 1399 (2004).
27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 252 (1829).
Id. at 246.
Id.
Id. at 250.
Id. at 252.
36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837).
Id. at 156-57 (Story, J., dissenting).
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the Court invalidated state regulations (as it did in The Passenger
constitutional unless they
Cases12D, because he believed state laws
128
conflicted with a positive act of Congress.
In 1851, the Court laid the foundation for the modern dormant
commerce clause doctrine. Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of
Philadelphia29 upheld the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania statute
that required ships arriving at or departing from the Port of
Philadelphia to hire a local pilot to assist with navigation. In Cooley,
the Court adopted both a new view of the allocation of authority over
interstate commerce and a new test for determining whether state
statutes violated the dormant commerce clause.
The Court first reversed its earlier holdings that congressional
power was exclusive, ruling instead that power over interstate
commerce was shared with the states. 130 To define the contours of this
shared power, the Court suggested that the appropriate inquiry was no
longer the origin of the power used to enact the statute, but rather the
nature of the subject of regulation: If the subject of regulation was
national in nature and required uniformity of treatment, state
regulations could not stand. But if the subject of regulation was local in
nature and would be well suited to a patchwork of regulation on the
basis of "local peculiarities," then state regulation would be
constitutional. 131
Applying that standard, the Court concluded that the
Pennsylvania local pilotage requirement did not violate the dormant
commerce clause:
[T]he nature of this subject is such, that until Congress should find it necessary to exert
its power, it should be left to the legislation of the states; that it is local and not national;
that it is likely to be the best provided for, not by one system, or plan of regulations, but
states should deem applicable to
by as many as the legislative discretion of the several
13 2
the local peculiarities of the ports within their limits.

Thus, after Cooley, the Court's analysis of state-based regulations of
interstate commerce in the absence of congressional action turned on

127. Smith v. Turner and Norris v. City of Boston, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
128. Id. at 470 (Taney, C.J., dissenting); see also Thurlow v. Massachusetts, Fletcher v. Rhode
Island, and Peirce v. New Hampshire (The License Cases), 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 579 (Opinion of
Taney, C.J.) (stating that state regulations are valid "unless they come in conflict with a law of
Congress").
129. 53 U.S. 299 (1851).
130. Id. at 318 ("The grant of commercial power to Congress does not contain any terms which
expressly exclude the states from exercising an authority over its subject-matter.").
131. Id. at 318-19.
132. Id. at 319.
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an analysis of the subject of, rather than the source of power for, the
regulation.
The Cooley test did not fare well. Over the next hundred and
twenty years, the Court adhered to the idea that congressional power
over commerce was shared with the states, but struggled to develop a
workable test for the constitutionality of state regulation in the absence
of congressional action. One modern treatise summarizes the attempts:
"Successive Courts invoked various verbal touchstones in an attempt to
formulate a predictable dichotomy between permitted and invalid state
exercise of regulatory power, but they were unable to find a test that
was not merely conclusory. 133 The details of the failed tests need not
detain us; they did not contribute, except in a negative sense, to the
development of the doctrine.
Finally, in 1970, the Court in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 134
formally adopted the flexible standard that still applies today:
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest,
and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree.
And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of
the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser
13 5
impact on interstate activities.

There are, of course, still scholarly disputes about exactly how this test
should be applied. 136 The Court itself has increasingly moved toward an
approach that is heavily deferential to state statutes, upholding most
nondiscriminatory state regulations.13 7 But however strong the
underlying presumption in favor of the validity of state laws, it is

133. 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK,TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.6
(2012). One might suspect that for at least part of that time, the efforts were plagued by the
problem that eventually brought down the formalists: bright line categorical formulations cannot
successfully answer oomplox constitutional questions. For a general refutation of formalism in
nnstitiitions ]aw, Fee D3\TFT- A FARBUIP k SUZANNA SHEPRY, DFsPERATFLv SFFKTNG CFITATTFTV:

THE MISGUIDED QUESTION FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS (2002).
134. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
135. Id. (citations omitted). Prior to 1970, as noted in Pike, the Court "[o]ccasionally...
ualldidly under[tookl a balanuing approach irarcsolv-ing these issues5."
Id. at 142. Thu budmicing
test did not become black-letter law until Pike, however.
136. See, e.g., John M. Baker & Mehmet K. Konar-Steenberg, 'Drawn from Local
Knowledge... and Conformed to Local Wants": Zoning and Incremental Reform of Dormant
Commerce Clause Doctrine, 38 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 1 (2006); Daniel A. Farber, State Regulation and
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 3 CONST COMMENT. 395 (1986).

137. See, e.g., Dep't of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 353 (2008) (suggesting that Pike
imposes a high burden on those challenging state regulations); see also BRAINNON P. DENNINC,
BITTKER ON THE REGULATION OF INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE § 6.05 (2d ed. 2013)
(concluding that courts rarely invalidate non discriminatory statutes).
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nevertheless only a presumption. The Court retains for itself the power
to determine whether any given state law interferes with the
unarticulated federal interest in the free flow of commerce. As one
scholar puts it, "The judicially enforced dormant Commerce Clause...
mows down state-imposed obstacles to interstate commerce." 138
State power ebbed and flowed under the various iterations of the
dormant commerce clause. At each turn, however, the Court was free to
focus solely on the federalism question before it: exactly how to
determine whether a state statute interfered with the unarticulated
interest in the free flow of commerce. The Court invented the dormant
commerce clause early in the nineteenth century and laid down the
basic principles in 1851, both well before doubts about judicial power
began to undermine the complacency of the natural law and formalist
eras. By the time the Court adopted the modern formulation in 1970,
Realist fears of judicial overreaching had long since receded-indeed,
the Court was perhaps at the height of its authority.
During the three or four decades leading up to the late 1930s'
heightened awareness of concerns about judicial authority, the Court
struggled unsuccessfully to define the exact boundaries of the dormant
commerce clause, but the basic principles were too well settled-and
functioning too well-to question. 139 Thus, critics of the doctrine at that
time urged the Court not to abandon it but rather to adopt the favorite
approach of Progressives, a balancing test.140 Justice Stone, dissenting
in 1928, articulated a test very similar to the one ultimately adopted in
Pike:
[T]hose interferences not deemed forbidden are to be sustained, not because the effect on
commerce is nominally indirect, but because a consideration of all the facts and
circumstances, such as the nature of the regulation, its function, the character of the
business involved and the actual effect on the flow of commerce, lead to the conclusion

138. MICHAEL S. GREVE, THE UPSIDE-DOWN CONSTITUTION 93 (2012).
139. The general functioning of the dormant commerce clauce (depite some discomfort with
drawing particular lines) is what distinguishes Erie from the 1938 case of South CarolinaState
Highway Department v. Barnwell, 303 U.S. 177 (1938). The Court was able to reach its preferred
reoult, upholding the state regulation againot a dormant commerce olauoo challenge, by citing
established principles going back to Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245
(1829); it did not need to overturn any precedent. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), by
contract, had become unworkable and once the Court determined that something had to be done
about Swift, the influence of separation of powers concerns distorted its solution to the problem.
140. See HORWITZ, supra note 54, at 18 ('The emergence of balancing tests in numerous areas
of the law is a prominent measure of the success of Progressive legal thinkers in undermining
categorical thought.").
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that the regulation concerns interests peculiarly local and does not infringe the national
interest in maintaining the freedom of commerce across state lines. 141

Dormant commerce clause doctrine, then, developed naturally,
uninfluenced by concerns about judicial overreaching. 142 And this
natural development produced a doctrine that ordinarily allows
unhindered operation of state law, but reserves to the courts the power
to displace that law in favor of federal interests even when those
interests have not been articulated by Congress. This ordinary scheme
is in sharp contrast to the Erie doctrine.
2. Implied Preemption
Chief Justice Marshall also laid the theoretical framework for
implied preemption in general, and obstacle preemption in particular,
in the early nineteenth century. In M'Culloch v. Maryland,143 the Court
held in part that a Maryland statute, which purported to tax any bank
not chartered by the Maryland legislature, was preempted because it
interfered with the National Bank established by Congress. 144 In
reaching that conclusion, the Court reasoned that "[s]tates have no
power... to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, the
operations of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress." 1 45 Indeed,
M'Culloch constitutes the Court's first express recognition of the notion
that state laws must give way to the extent that they interfere with the
1 46
"full and complete effects" of congressional statutes.
In Gibbons v. Ogden,1 47 the Court provided additional support
for the notion that congressional purposes could force displacement of
state law in certain instances. As noted earlier, Marshall skirted the
question whether states had any authority to regulate interstate
commerce. He was able to do so because the New York statute
conferring on a private individual exclusive navigation rights on
interstate waters "interfere [d] with," "came into collision with," and was
141. Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 44 (1928) (Stone, J., dissenting). In one 1945 case,
the Court seemed to adopt a balancing test, see S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945), but
later characterized that care ao one of an "occasional" suggestion of a balancing test. Piko v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
142. Michael Greve has suggested that some modern scholars-especially originalists-are
making sepaiation of powers arguments against the dormant commnerce clause doctrine: 'Thc only
constitutional doctrine that is in any danger of being strangled by Lochncr's ghost is the dormant
Commerce Clause." GREVE, supra note 138, at 393.
143. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
144. Id. at 436-37.
145. Id. at 436.
146. Id. at 330.
147. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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"contrary to" a federal licensing statute and was thus unconstitutional
regardless of residual state authority. 148 The Court's recognition of
interference-in addition to direct collision-with a federal statute as
sufficient grounds for invalidating an otherwise valid state statute
lends substantial support to the modern doctrine of obstacle
preemption.
More than a century after Gibbons, the Court conclusively
established the obstacle preemption doctrine in Hines v. Davidowitz,
decided in 1941.149 In Hines, the Court reviewed a challenge to a
Pennsylvania statute requiring most aliens over the age of eighteen to
register with the state yearly and to provide the government with
certain personal information and pay a nominal registration fee at each
annual registration. 15 0 The act also required aliens to carry an alien
identification card at all times and to show it upon demand by any police
officer. 151 The Supreme Court reviewed the statute in light of a federal
act that required all aliens fourteen or older to register once with the
federal government, and to provide their fingerprints as well as certain
1 52
personal information.
The Court held that the Pennsylvania statute was impliedly
preempted by the federal statute, but not under traditional notions of
impossibility or field preemption. 153 Instead, the Court declared that
state statutes must "yield to" the federal statutes when they constitute
an "obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress." 154 The Court relied on legislative history
evincing a congressional intent-not clearly evident in the text of the
federal statute-that federal alien registration standards should be
uniform across the states. 155 Because the Pennsylvania statute imposed
additional requirements, the Court found that it constituted an obstacle
to Congress's purposes and held it to be preempted as a result.156 The
Court refused to establish any categorical test for when an otherwise
valid state statute would be constitutionally compelled to yield to

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 211.
312 U.S. 52 (1941).
Id. at 59-60.
Id.
Id. at 60-61.
Id. at 74.
Id. at 67.
Id. at 72-73.
Id. at 73-74.
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unarticulated federal interests. Instead, the Court opted for case-by157
case factual and legal analysis.
The initial adoption of the obstacle preemption doctrine in Hines
was qualified in two ways. First, the Court suggested that preemption
in that case was compelled, at least in part, because regulation of
foreign relations-and, by extension, regulation of immigration and
alien registration-was an area of clear federal supremacy. 158 That
aspect of Hines ripened into a suggestion that Congress has "occupied
the field of alien registration."' 159 To the extent that Hines thus fell at
the intersection of obstacle and field preemption, the immediate
implications of Hines were limited.
Second, in Reitz v. Mealey1 60 ten months later, the Court upheld
(against a preemption challenge) a state law that effectively made
automobile-accident judgments non-dischargeable under federal
bankruptcy laws. Although the Court's reasoning was brief and opaque,
it seemed to rest largely on an argument that the state statute was
enacted not to regulate debtor-creditor relations but rather as an
exercise of the state's police power to enforce highway safety.
The significance of the state police power was confirmed six
years later in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Co., 16 1 in which the Court
adopted a presumption against preemption when a state law was
enacted pursuant to the "historic police powers of the States."1 62 The
Court would presume that Congress intended not to preempt a state
statute enacted pursuant to the historic police powers of the states
absent "clear and manifest" evidence of an intent to preempt. 163 The
Court in Rice nevertheless invalidated the state statute at issue-which
involved grain warehousing-on the ground that it conflicted with
policies evinced by a federal statute. It is telling that even in the case
in which the Court formally announced a limit on obstacle preemption,
it found the state law preempted; the vitality of the limit therefore
1 64
seems questionable.

157. Id. at 74. That case-by-case analysis led to several findings of preemption within a few
years of Hines, although the type of preemption was not alwayo clear. See Hill v,Florida, 325 U.S.
538 (1945); Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942).
158. Hines, 312 U.S. at 70.
159. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2502 (2012).
160. 314 U.S. 33, 37 (1941).
161. 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
162. Id. at 230.
163. Id.
164. One commentator, surveying modern preemption cases generally, has concluded that the
presumption "was little more than a platitude for the Court to mention before moving with
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Unsurprisingly, given the equivocal nature of Rice, the policepower limitation on obstacle preemption did not generate much
progeny. In only two cases in the next two decades-one of them
involving a statute almost identical to the highway-safety statute
upheld in Reitz-did the Court rely on the presumption against
preemption to uphold state statutes enacted under state police
powers. 165 In a third case, the Court invalidated a state statute over the
dissent of three Justices who argued that the presumption should save
it.166

In 1971, the Court confronted for a third time the question
whether federal bankruptcy laws preempted a state statute exempting
from discharge in federal bankruptcy a state judgment obtained as a
result of an automobile accident. With only five cases mentioning the
police powers presumption-and only three of them actually relying on
it-the Court did not feel constrained by precedent. In Perez v.
Campbell,16 7 it overruled both Reitz and the other case directly on point
(Kesler), and implicitly abandoned the presumption itself. The purpose
of the state statute-presumably including purposes related to
traditional police powers-could not be relevant: "We can no longer
adhere to the aberrational doctrine of Kesler and Reitz that state law
may frustrate the operation of federal law as long as the state
legislature in passing its law had some purpose in mind other than one
of frustration."1 68 The Court summarized its new approach as
reiterating "the controlling principle that any state legislation which
frustrates the full effectiveness of federal law is rendered invalid by the
169
Supremacy Clause."
Technically, Perez's "controlling principle" is still in effect. The
Court has recently moved in the direction of a more general
presumption against preemption, although it applies the presumption
rather inconsistently (and often with great disagreement among the
Justices).1 70 Scholars also disagree about the soundness of a
dispatch to find preemption." Mary J. Davis, The "New" Presumption Against Preemption, 61
HASTINGS L.J. 1217, 1222 (2010).
165. See Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963); Kesler v. Dep't of
Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153 (1962).
166. Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961); see also id. at 313 (Black, J., dissenting).
167. 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
168. Id. at 651-52.
169. Id. at 652 (emphasis added).
170. Compare, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (preempted), AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (preempted), Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529
U.S. 861 (2000) (preempted), Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000)
(preempted), and Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992) (preempted), with
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presumption against preemption. 171 As with the dormant commerce
clause, however, the existence of a presumption does not deprive the
Court of authority to displace state laws as necessary.
Obstacle preemption thus does not have quite the pedigree that
the dormant commerce clause doctrine does. Although both can trace
their roots to the Marshall Court, explicit recognition of the preemption
doctrine occurred almost a century later than explicit recognition of the
dormant commerce clause. 172 That lag, however, turned out not to be
significant.
In one sense, Hines is a surprising development for 1941. Only
four years past 1937, the Court might be expected to still be concerned
about judicial overreaching. But not only were those concerns fading
quickly, Hines itself allowed the Court quite limited authority. The case
involved foreign relations, and the contemporaneous case of Reitz
seemed to carve out a large exception for state statutes enacted under
the police power. So we might view the early obstacle preemption
doctrine as a transitional phenomenon. A Court somewhat less
distracted by judicial-authority concerns than it had been a few years
earlier adopts a somewhat limited approach to judicial power to protect
unarticulated federal interests.
Had the Court faced numerous similar cases during the 1940s
and early 1950s, perhaps it would have applied the presumption
against preemption consistently and built up a body of precedent that
might be difficult to overrule. But there were only a handful of cases
even potentially implicating state police powers-and only two, Reitz
and Rice, were decided before 1960-and thus concerns about
separation of powers had time to fade before the limitations of Hines
really took hold. By 1971, those concerns had essentially evaporated,
and the Court was free, in Perez, to jettison both the precedents and the
limitations on its own authority.1 73 Thus, as with the dormant

CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175 (2014) (not preempted), and Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S.
555 (2009) (not preempted). See also Merrill, supra note 15, at 741 ("Mhe presumption against
pieemption is huiviwed as much ii the breach ws in the observance.").

171. Compare, e.g., Clark, supra note 83, at 1427-30 (defending presumption), Roderick M.
Hills, Jr., Against Preemption:How Federalism Can Improve the NationalLegislative Process, 82
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2007) (same), Meltzer, supra note 9 (same), and Ernest A. Young, "The Ordinary
Diet of the Law"7 The PresumptionAgainst Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 SuP. CT. REV.
253 (same), with Dinh, supra note 32 (attacking presumption), and Nelson, supra note 15 (same).
172. Stephen Gardbaum suggests that preemption as a general doctrine was not well
ctablinhed until the early twentieth century. Gardbaum, supra note 15, at 785,805. Whother or
not that io correct, it is clear that obstaolo preemption is of relativoly recent vintage.
173. Only recently have such concerns resurfaced, and, unsurprisingly, application of the
Perez doctrine is now unpredictable. Nevertheless, the Court has not repudiated its own authority
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commerce clause, the doctrine ultimately developed free of the
distorting effect of concerns about judicial overreachingl 7 4-- once again,
unlike the Erie doctrine.
3. Preclusion
Preclusion doctrines are complex enough when they involve only
one jurisdiction. Intersystem preclusion-that is, the preclusive effect a
court in one jurisdiction should give to a judgment from another
jurisdiction-raises additional questions. The Full Faith and Credit
Act, 175 originally enacted in 1790 and essentially unchanged since
then, 176 requires federal courts (as well as courts in sister states) to give
the same preclusive effect to a prior state-court judgment that would be
given to it by the courts in that state. There is no federal statute,
however, that specifies the preclusive effect to be given federal-court
judgments in subsequent suits in either state or federal courts.
The doctrines governing the preclusive effect of federal-court
judgments were therefore developed by the Supreme Court in commonlaw fashion. The first question to arise was whether the Supreme Court
even had jurisdiction to review a state court's refusal to accord a prior
federal-court judgment preclusive effect. In 1874, in Dupasseur v.
177 the Court held that it did. "Where a State court refuses to
Rochereau,
give effect to the judgment of a court of the United States," the case
arises under federal law and is thus within federal jurisdiction. 178
to protect unarticulated federal interests; it has merely been less likely (but, importantly, not
completely unwilling) to find such interests in the absence of a textual basis in the statute.
174. As with Eric, however, come scholars have tried to inject separation of power- concerns
into contemporary preemption debates. See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Process-BasedPreemption, in
PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM'S CORE QUESTION 192, 213
(William W, Buzbee ed., 2009) (presumption against preemption "ensure[s] that Congress and the
president rather than judges make the crucial decision to override otate law"); Young, supra
note 171, at 321-22 (suggesting that modern preemption doctrine represents a "shift [away] from
relatively vigorous judicial enforcement of constitutional boundaries").
175. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012).
176. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 n.8 (1980).
177. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 130 (1874).
178. Id. at 134; accord Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 167 (1938); Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chi.
& St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Long Island Loan & Tr. Co., 172 U.S. 493, 507-10 (1899); Crescent City Live
Stock Co. v. Butchers' Union Slaughter-House Co., 120 U.S. 141, 146 (1887). Dupasseur also held
that the case was within the Supreme Court's statutory jurisdiction as one in which the state court
ruled against a right claimed "under an authority exercised under the United States." 88 U.S. at
134.
Dupasscur also held that, at least in diversity cases, "no higher sanctity or effect can be
claimed for the judgment [of a federal court] . than is due to the judgments of the State courts
in a like case and under similar circumstances." Id. at 135. This seemingly broad statement,
however, should not be read to as a limit on the power of federal courts to protect unartioulatod
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Especially in federal-question cases, the Court has repeatedly held that
the preclusive effect of judgments issued by federal courts is governed
by doctrines established by federal judges rather than borrowed from
state law. 179 Indeed, it reiterated that principle less than six months
after Erie was decided.180 Under this longstanding principle, the Court
has continued to develop federal preclusion law independent of state
law, for example by abandoning the traditional common-law
18
requirement of mutuality. '
Thus when the Court reconsidered the Dupasseurissue in 2001,
for the first time in almost a century, it was not writing on a clean slate.
The Court had already recognized the existence of the federal interest
in preclusion doctrines for federal-court judgments. It had experience
both developing common-law preclusion doctrines and applying them.
Moreover, Dupasseur itself could be viewed as archaic: it was decided
under a different procedural regime, had produced little progeny, and
82
had not been reexamined in the modern procedural landscape.I
So matters stood when the Court decided Semtek International,
Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. in 2001.183 Semtek involved a diversity
federal interests, for two reasons. First, the Court in Dupasoeurand other cases examined whether
the state court had in fact rcached the csn'cot decision under state law, concluding in at least one
case that the state court had not done so. See id.; see also Crescent City Live Stock Co., 120 U.S. at
160. Both the exercise of federal jurisdiction and the Court's review of the state court's state- law
dmsiui aie inconsistent with iiiterpieLihg Dpuwseur broadly a6 a linit on federal judicial
lawmaking power. How can the case arise under federal law if federal law does not govern the
dispute? And ordinarily, the Supreme Court will not second-guess a state court's application of
state law. See, e.g., Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874). Both problems are solved
if we interpret Dupaoeeurto hold that while federal law governs the preclusive effect of federal
court judgments, the content of federal law should be borrowed from state law, at least in diversity
cados. Such all iutcrprvtatiof1 pita Du, acur squarely in lifi wuith the dorinat cuui,,ieYu clause
and preemption cases, insofar as the federal courts presumptively defer to state law but retain
ultimate control over the vindication of unarticulated federal interests. The other reason not to
read Dupaoseur broadly is that it was decided under a very different procedural regime. For
diersity cmqes, a series of federal statutes culminating in the Conformity Act of 1872, 171 Stt.
§ 196 (1872) (repealed 1934), directed federal courts to fellow state procedural rules. Dupasseur
thus arguably rested on an assumption that preclusion doctrines should be considered procedural.
Until 2001., in fact, all of the Court's cases regarding the preclusive effect of federal-court diversity
judgments had been decided before 1938 when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure replaced the
Conformity Act and therefore under the Conformity Act.
179. See, e.g., Gunter v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 200 U.S. 273, 290-91 (1906); Deposit Bank
v. Frankfort, 191 U.S. 499, 516-17 (1903).
180. Stoll, 305 U.S. at 170-71.
181. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ.
of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
182. See supra note 178.
183. 531 U.S. 497 (2001). Some scholars include Semtek as a case involving an enclave of
ferdarq! common law (diacl-ed in the next Section). I dia-kgree, for reasons I outline in note 22,
supra.
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suit for breach of contract, which was first filed in state court in
California, then removed to federal court and dismissed on state statute
of limitations grounds. The plaintiff then filed another breach of
contract suit against the same defendant-based on the same
allegations of fact-in state court in Maryland, which had a longer
statute of limitations. The Maryland courts dismissed the suit on
grounds of res judicata. Regardless of whether California state law
would bar the subsequent suit, the Maryland court held, it was barred
under federal preclusion law because the California federal court's
18 4
dismissal was "on the merits."
The Supreme Court granted the plaintiffs petition for certiorari,
held,
first, that Dupasseur was not dispositive because it was
and
decided under the Conformity Act, and, second, that Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 41(b) did not control whether 5every "on the merits"
18
dismissal should be accorded preclusive effect.
Having thus cleared away the brush, the Court was left to decide
the preclusion question. After noting that "no ... federal textual
provision, neither of Lhe Constitution nor of any statute, addresses the
18 6
claim-preclusive effect of a judgment in a federal diversity action,"
Justice Scalia's opinion for a unanimous Court claimed for the federal
judiciary the authority to decide all quesLions of Lhe preclusive effect of
federal-court judgments, whether those judgments were issued in
diversity cases or federal-question cases: "[F]ederal common law
governs the claim-preclusive effect of a dismissal by a federal court
sitting in diversity."18 7 The Court characterized Dupasseur as resting
on the principle that "the State was allowed (indeed, required) to give a
federal diversity judgment no more effect than it would accord one of its
own judgments only because reference to state law was the federal rule
88
that this Court deemed appropriate."'
And what is the federal common-law preclusion rule that should
apply in diversity cases? The Court held that because there was no need
for a uniform federal preclusion rule in diversity cases, the federal
courts should adopt the preclusion law of the state in which the
judgment-issuing court sat.18 9 Thus, federal common law governs the
preclusive effect of all federal-court judgments, but in diversity cases,
the content of that common law should mirror state law. Reinforcing
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Semtek, 531 U.S. at 499-500.
Id. at 500-06.
Id. at 507.
Id. at 508.
Id.
Id.
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the principle that federal preclusion law is nevertheless federal common
law, and that the federal judiciary has the power to protect federal
interests even if doing so displaces state law, the Court added that the
"reference to state law will not obtain, of course, in situations in which
the state law is incompatible with federal interests." 190
The Semtek doctrine, then, is analogous to both the dormant
commerce clause and obstacle preemption. In the absence of a clear
congressional command, the federal judiciary is authorized to make
federal common law in order to protect unarticulated federal interests.
Although there is-in diversity cases as in dormant commerce clause
and preemption cases-a presumption that state law will govern, the
courts retain authority to override the presumption and apply federal
rather than state law.
As this history shows, federal preclusion law developed over a
century and a half, and did so unencumbered by concerns about judicial
overreaching. The Court's background presumption, giving federal
diversity judgments the same preclusive effect that they would have in
state court, was an allocation of authority based solely on federalism
principles-as illustrated by the fact that the Court made the same
choice unanimously in two very different eras. The only question
decided during the crucial era of the late 1930s (indeed, for most of the
twentieth century) was the preclusive effect of federal-question
judgments. Unsurprisingly, even in 1938 at the height of the rejection
of judicial power, the Court did not view that question as novel or
pivotal from either a federalism or separation of powers perspective,
and thus continued to follow the line of precedent from earlier eras.
When the Court once again returned to the diversity question, both the
timing and the history of the Court's preclusion cases allowed it to make
a decision unclouded by whatever concerns about judicial overreaching
were otherwise floating back into judicial consciousness.
4. Enclaves of Federal Common Law
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, federal
common law developed freely. Before Erie, there was no need to
distinguish any particular area of law as especially appropriate for the
application of federal, rather than state, law. As long as no state statute
existed and the subject was not peculiarly local, federal common law
applied. But in some areas, application of federal common law rested on

190. Id. For an excellent discussion of possible situations in which state preclusion law might
bo incompatible with fodoral interests, soo Patrick Woolley, The Sources ofFcderal PreclusionLaw
After Semtek, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 527, 532-34, 564-75 (2003).
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additional independent grounds. Two of the most important involved
disputes between states and maritime-or admiralty-law.
Admiralty law was one of the earliest and most robust areas in
which the federal courts created law in common-law fashion. As thenProfessor (now Judge) William Fletcher has demonstrated, admiralty
law was a well-known instance of the "general law merchant," which
depended on the law of no individual state or nation. 191 The most
significant questions arising under admiralty law involved the
to the questions that
boundariesbetween state and federal law, similar
192
arose under the dormant commerce clause.
Disputes between states also necessarily implicate federal law.
the
Court has frequently noted, no state "can legislate for, or impose
As
its own policy upon" another state. 193 If no congressional act settles a
dispute between states, the courts must instead draw upon "what may
not improperly be called interstate common law."1 94 Prior to Erie, the
governing
Court therefore developed a body of common-law precedent 195
rights.
riparian
over
disputes
especially
interstate disputes,
Erie deprived the federal courts of their general power to make
common law. Did it also prohibit federal courts from continuing to
create federal common law in specialized cases justified by additional
circumstances, like admiralty and interstate riparian disputes? The
Court answered that question quickly. On the same day that Erie was
decided, Justice Brandeis authored a unanimous opinion in Hinderlider
v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co. 1 96 In a diversity case
191. See Fletcher, supra note 74.
192. See, e.g., S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917). Jensen recognized the analogy. In
noting that "it would be difficult, if not imposoible, to define with exactnoco" the boundary between
valid aud invalid 6tate legislation, tuuchirig on adimualty mattrs,the Couit cited Cooley v. Bow d
of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851) (among others). Jensen, 244 U.S. at 216. The Court also
noted the cimilarity between the rules governing the extont of otato authority over admiralty and
the rules governing the extent of state authority over interstate commerce. Id. at 216-17.
193. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 95 (1907).
194. Id. at 98.
195. See, e.g., id.; Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517 (1936); New Jersey v. New York, 283
U.S. 336 (1931); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259
U.S. 419 (1922), vacated on other grounds, 353 U.S. 953 (1957).
196. 304 U.S. 92 (1938). Ofcouroc, one could also characterize the rule of Eric itself as federal
common law. See Craig Green, Can Erie Survive as Federal Common Law?, 54 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 813 (2013); Nelson, supra note 38, at 985-86. That leads to the paradox that "judge-made
federal law tells us that judges cannot make federal law." Louise Weinberg, FederalCommon Law,
83 NW. U. L. REV. 805, 806 (1989). Judge Henry Friendly famously suggested that Eric itself made
possible the development of these enclaves of federal common law: "[H]aving rid itself of
oubconscious feelings of guilt for federal poaching on state proorvo, the Supreme Court became
freer to insist on deference to federal decisions by the stato whore deference wac due." Friendly,
supra note 24, at 407.
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between two private parties arguing about water rights, the Court
applied its own precedent rather than the law of any state, because
"whether the water of an interstate stream must be apportioned ... is
a question of'federal common law' . ."197 The Court neither mentioned
Erie nor recognized any tension between it and Hinderlider.
Over the years, the Court has identified a handful of other
narrow "'enclaves' in which [it] acknowledged its exercise of federal
lawmaking power." 198 Those enclaves-which the Court has described
as "few and restricted" 199-are justified, according to the Court, because
they involve situations "in which a federal rule of decision is 'necessary
to protect uniquely federal interests.' " 200 After Hinderliderin 1938, the
other enclaves were established gradually, one at a time over the next
fifty years.
In 1943, the Court held, in Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
2
States, 0 1 that cases affecting the rights and obligations of the United
States in commercial transactions were governed by federal common
law. A federal rule was necessary because of the need for uniformity:
identical transactions by the United States should not be "subject to the
vagaries of the laws of the several states." 202 Moreover, because the
government's authority to enter into such transactions was of
constitutional and federal statutory origin, the governing law was
20 3
necessarily also federal.
Illustrating its post-Erie reluctance to expand the reach of
federal common law, the Court did not confirm another area of federal
common law until almost two decades later. It held in 1961 that Erie
had not diminished the longstanding judicial power to create federal
admiralty law. 20 4 Tellingly, when it did so it once again failed to cite or
distinguish Erie. Instead, it described the process of finding the
boundaries of admiralty law as "one of accommodation, entirely familiar

197. Hinderlider,304 U.S. at 110.
198. Tidmarsh & Murray, supra note 22, at 588.
199. Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963).
200. Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981) (quoting Banco
Naciona] de Cuba v Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964)), For an excellent overview and defense
of these enclaves, see Tidmarsh & Murray, supra note 22.
201. Clearfield Tr. Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943); accord United States v. Kimbell
Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
202. Clearfield Trust, 318 U.S. at 367.
203. Id. at 365.
204. Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731 (1961).
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in many areas of overlapping state and federal concern," 205 and drew an
20 6
analogy to the dormant commerce clause by citing Cooley.
In 1964, the Court added foreign relations to the list of areas
governed by federal common law. 20 7 Explicitly distinguishing Erie, the
Court held that rules governing foreign affairs "should not be left to
divergent and perhaps parochial state interpretations."' 20 8 Another two
decades passed without any changes to the common-law landscape.
Then, in 1988, the Court created a federal common-law "government
contractor defense" to state-law tort suits. 20 9 Drawing a parallel to both
210
preemption cases and the few existing areas of federal common law,
the Court held that the "civil liabilities arising out of the performance
of federal procurement contracts" implicated a "uniquely federal
interest" that demanded the application of federal common law. 211 No
new enclaves of federal common law have been added since 1988.212
Thus the cases involving federal common law are few and far
between. Even more important, the Court has viewed them as unique
and individual rather than as part of a general pattern of
accommodating state and federal interests. As one commentator notes,
"The Court seems to consider Erie and the Rules of Decision Act
irrelevant to these cases." 2 13 Another points to their "gingerly and
apologetic tone."214 A third characterizes them as concerning "topics
215
that lie beyond the reach of state law."
Both the existence of these enclaves of federal common law and
their narrowness are consistent with my distinction between ordinary
federalism and the anomaly of Erie. It is unsurprising that even at the
height of concerns about judicial discretion the Court in Hinderliderfelt
compelled to follow precedent and apply existing federal common-law
doctrines to interstate riparian rights. The only alternatives were to
apply the law of one of the quarreling states, or to abdicate
responsibility altogether and refuse to decide the dispute. As the Court
pointed out early on, neither alternative can be right. No state may
205. Id. at 739.
206. Id. at 740.
207. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964).
208. Id. at 425.
209. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 503 (1988).
210. Id. at 504.
211. Id. at 505-06.
212. Some scholars would argue that Semtek added preclusion law in 2001. I disagree, for
reasons I explain in note 22, supra.
213. Perdue, supra note 107, at 753.
214. Weinberg, supra note 196, at 829.
215. Nelson, supra note 31, at 2.
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unilaterally impose its law on another. As for abdication, "disputes
between [states] must be settled either by force or else by appeal to
tribunals ...
[and] [iforce, under our system of government, is
216
eliminated."
By the time the next enclave was created, in 1943, concerns
about judicial overreaching were fading. Hinderlider had already
opened the door for the Court to distinguish Erie, so the substantive
Erie precedent exerted less influence. Moreover, Clearfield was an
exceedingly narrow decision, resting as it did partly on the ground that
the source of authority for the transaction underlying the suit was itself
federal. Thus Clearfield set the pattern for the remaining cases:
situations in which federal common law applied would be few and
extraordinary. The remaining cases confirm that the enclaves of federal
common law are more like ordinary federalism than they are like Erie.
The cases are few and far between, and most arose long after the Court
ceased to worry about its own authority. The Court sees no tension
between these cases and Erie, and draws analogies to ordinary
federalism instead.
Indeed, Erie's greatest relevance for these cases lies in the
contrast between the two. The pull of Erie ensures that the Court will
rarely find the application of federal common law appropriate-the
stars (and the precedents and the politics) must align in exactly the
right way. Ironically, however, it is these cases rather than Erie that
represent federalism in its ordinary form. Once again, Erie is the
anomaly.

III. THE CASE FOR NORMALIZING ERIE
Even if I am right that Erie is anomalous and that the anomaly
is the result of historical fortuity, we are still left with the question
whether Erie should be normalized. Recognizing Erie as anomalous
leaves three possible paths forward. We might leave things as they are,
simply accepting the divergence between Erie and the ordinary
federalism cases. We might revise the doctrines of ordinary federalism
to align them with Erie. Or we might revise Erie to align it with
ordinary federalism. In this Part, I begin by rejecting the first
possibility, instead defending the need to align Erie and ordinary
federalism. I conclude by rejecting the second possibility, arguing
instead that it is Erie, and not ordinary federalism, that needs revision.

216. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97 (1907).

2016]

NORMALIZING ERIE

1207

A. Erie's Exceptionalism and Judicial Transparency
We might rely on generic arguments to support a preference for
the elimination of legal anomalies. Any dissimilar treatment of similar
cases is problematic. Anomalies undermine the predictability of law,
exert distorting influences on other doctrines, and create inequities. To
paraphrase the Erie doctrine itself, neither the analysis nor the result
in a case should turn on exactly how the Court phrases the question
before it.
In the case of the divergence between Erie and ordinary
federalism, however, the problem is even worse. The anomalousness of
Erie allows the Court to exercise unfettered discretion while pretending
that the result is mandated by doctrinal precedent. Essentially, the
problem is this: If the Court characterizes the question before it as one
of ordinary federalism, then it is free to supplant state law to protect
unarticulated federal interests. But if it instead characterizes the
question as an Erie issue, then it cannot supplant state law unless it
finds the clash between state and federal law to be trivial. Placement of
a case on one side or the other of the line between Erie and ordinary
federalism drives the outcome.
The problem is most acute in the context of choosing whether to
analyze a particular dispute under the Erie doctrine or under the
doctrine of implied preemption. The structure of the problem lies in the
pressures that each doctrine places on statutory interpretation.
Obstacle preemption encourages the Court to read a federal statute for
all it's worth. 217 Erie requires it to adopt the "plain meaning," which in
practice sometimes turns out to be as narrowly as possible ... and
maybe even more so. 218 The consequence is that the (unacknowledged
and therefore undefended) decision about how to characterize the
dispute can often make the difference between displacing or not
displacing state law.
Two real-world examples prove the point. First, the Court
changed the characterization of conflicts between state law and the
Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), first considering them under Erie and

217. See supra Part II.C.2; see also sources cited in notes 19-21.
218. The "plain meaning" directive comes from Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750
n.9 (1980). For an example of how the Court tortures the meaning of a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure to avoid a conflict with state law, compare West v. Conrail,481 U.S. 35 (1987) (in federalquestion case, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 means that filing tolls the statute of limitations),
with Walber (in diversity case, Federl RP of Civil Procedure R does not mean that filing toI!h the
statute of limitations). See also Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of adopting an unduly narrow interpretation of Rule 59).

1208

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:5:1161

then under obstacle preemption-and that recharacterization changed
results. Second, the Court was able to reserve the authority to disregard
state preclusion law in Semtek only because it did not treat the issue as
an Erie question.
The effect of exercising unacknowledged discretion to
characterize the question as either Erie or implied preemption plays out
most apparently in the Court's jurisprudence under the Federal
Arbitration Act. 2 19 Section 2 of the FAA applies to "contract[s]
evidencing a transaction involving commerce" and makes most
arbitration clauses in such contracts "valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable." 220 The FAA was enacted in 1925, before Erie. After Erie
the question naturally arose whether the FAA should be applied in
diversity cases that were governed by the substantive law of states that
221
made arbitration clauses revocable or unenforceable.
In Bernhardt v. PolygraphicCo. of America,222 the Court ducked
the question by interpreting the FAA narrowly to exclude the contract
at issue. To do otherwise, the Court held, would raise a serious
constitutional question under Erie.22 3 After holding the FAA
inapplicable, moreover, the Court went on to hold that the distinction
between arbitration and litigation "substantially affects the cause of
action created by the State," and that "[t]he nature of the tribunal
where suits are tried is an important part of the parcel of rights behind
a cause of action." 2 24 Thus, under Erie, an uncodified federal preference
for the enforceability of arbitration clauses could not displace a state
preference against them.
Bernhardt posed a serious practical problem, insofar as it
suggested that the FAA could be constitutionally applied only in
federal-question cases and not in diversity cases. A decade later the
Court found a way around the constitutional barrier, over a vigorous
dissent by Justices Black, Douglas, and Stewart. The Court held in
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co. 225 that the
FAA was based on Congress's power to "prescribe how federal courts
219. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2012).

220. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
221. Linda R. Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalizationof Arbitration
Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1305, 1313-18 (1985), contains a good summary of the problem.
222. 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
223. Id. at 202.
224. Id. at 203. Justice Frankfurter, concurring, went even further. He opined that "it would
raise a serious question of constitutional law whether Congress could subject to arbitration
litigation in the fodoral courts which is thero solely beocauce" of diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 208
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
225. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
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are to conduct themselves,"' 226 in other words, that it was procedural
and therefore outside of Erie's strictures.
PrimaPaintcreated its own problem: if the FAA was procedural,
then it couldn't apply in state courts. In 1984 the Court solved that
problem. In Southland Corp. v. Keating,227 the Court held that the FAA
was a substantive enactment resting on Congress's constitutional
authority under the Commerce Clause. As such, it was mandatory on
both state and federal courts in all cases within its scope. Justice
O'Connor, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented, arguing that as a
matter of legislative history, "Congress believed that the FAA
established nothing more than a rule of procedure." 228 In an ironic tourde-force of bootstrapping, the majority rejected Justice O'Connor's
arguments on the ground that because the FAA was applicable in
federal-court diversity cases (under Prima Paint), holding it
inapplicable in state courts would cause forum-shopping.
This sequence of cases is admittedly dizzying; the Court kept
changing its mind about the basis for, and interpretation of, the FAA.
For my purposes, however, the real problem lies in the Court's choices
after the move from Bernhardt to Southland. Once the Court
determined in Southland that the FAA was a substantive enactment
codifying the federal interest in the enforceability of arbitration clauses,
Erie became irrelevant with regard to its explicit provisions. But what
about questions on which the FAA is less than explicit?
Bernhardt had considered that very issue, under the Erie
doctrine. Because of its holding that the FAA did not apply to the case
before it, the Court had to consider whether an unarticulatedinterest
in the general enforceability of arbitration clauses (perhaps evidenced
by the passage of the FAA) should displace state law. Under Erie, the
clear answer is negative: unarticulated federal interests can never
supplant state law. And so the Bernhardt Court held.
After Southland, however, the Court began to consider the
question as one of implied preemption. And, in keeping with ordinary
federalism's broad judicial authority to protect unarticulated federal
interests, the Court frequently displaced state law in situations in
226. Id. at 405; see also id. at 411 (Black, J., dissenting) (describing the FAA as "designed to
provide merely a procedural remedy which would not interfere with state substantive law").
227. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).

228. Id. at 26 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). For further support for Justice O'Connor's view, see
IAN

R.

MACNEIL,

AMERICAN

ARBITRATION

LAW:

REFORMATION,

NATIONALIZATION,

INTERNALIZATION (1992); and Hiro N. Aragaki, The FederalArbitrationAct as ProceduralReform,
89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1939 (2014). For a contrary view, see Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of
Southland: Reexamining the Legislative History of the FederalArbitrationAct, 78 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 101 (2002).
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which the FAA's language did not clearly require it, in order to protect
the unarticulated federal interest in the full enforceability of
arbitration clauses. 229 As one scholar has put it, "[F]ederal courts may
decide issues not expressly covered by the FAA by crafting a federal
'230
common law rule.
The move from an Erie analysis to an implied preemption
analysis thus changed results. One commentator has criticized Prima
Paint and its progeny on the ground that they violate Erie by creating
a federal common law of arbitration. 231 The problem is actually much
worse than that: Erie's uniqueness allows the Court to "violate" it at
will by recharacterizing the issue as one of ordinary federalism. Or, as
one commentator has provocatively put it, implied preemption "reflects
232
the can't-live-with-Erie side" of federalism jurisprudence.
Semtek offers a second example, beyond the implied preemption
context, of how characterizing an issue as either an Erie question or a
question of ordinary federalism makes a substantial practical
difference. Because the Court analyzed the question of the preclusive
effect of federal-court judgments in diversity under the framework of
ordinary federalism, it could conclude that federal interests might
potentially demand the displacement of state preclusion law. But
imagine that instead the Court had viewed the question as implicating
Erie.233 With no dispositive federal statute or rule, the Court would have
inquired whether the difference between applying state preclusion laws
and federal preclusion laws (derived from the doctrines governing the
preclusive effect of federal-question judgments) could create inequities
or encourage vertical forum-shopping. The procedural posture of
Semtek does not allow us to be certain, but it is likely that in some cases,
if not in Semtek itself, state and federal preclusion rules differ enough

229. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
230. Hirshman, supranote 221, at 1347; see also Ronald Aronovsky, The Supreme Court and
the Future of Arbitration:Towards A Preemptive Fcdcral ArbitrationProceduralParadigm?, 42
Sw. L. REV. 131, 135 (2012) (explaining that the Court has "expand[ed] the breadth of FAA
preemption.., based as much or more on the Court's view of the federal pro-arbitration policy
than the language of the FAA itself').
231. Richard L. Barnes, Prima Paint Pushed Compulsory Arbitration Under the Erie Train, 2
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 1 (2007).

232. Michael Greve, Atlas Croaks. Supreme Court Shrugs., 6 CHARLESTON L. REV. 15, 32
(2011).
233. At least one commentator had urged that it do so. See Stephen B. Burbank,
InterjurisdictionalPreclu3ion, Full Faith and Credit and Federal Common Law, 71 CORNELL L.
REV. 733 (1986). Othcrs have criticized the Court for its failure to consider Semtek under the Erie
doctrine. See Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 23.
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to encourage forum-shopping.2 14 So if the Court had characterized
Semtek as raising an Erie question, it would have held-as it did-that
state preclusion law governed, but it would have been unable to reserve
the authority to disregard state law "in situations in which the state
235
law is incompatible with federal interests."
Of course, with any given statute the move could go in either
direction. If the Court prefers to protect unarticulated federal interests,
it can characterize the question before it as one of implied preemption.
If the Court prefers not to, it can characterize it as an Erie question.
The important point is that the divergence between Erie and ordinary
federalism doctrines pushes that decision underground, allowing the
Court to pretend that it is not really exercising discretion. In the
absence of the anomaly, the decision would be more transparent. The
Court would always have to explain why the presumption in favor of
state law was or was not overcome in each particular case. That
salutary result should be enough-together with a general preference
for treating like cases alike-to support a conclusion that we should not
leave Erie as an anomaly.
B. A Defense of Ordinary Federalism
Even if we conclude that the divergence between Erie and
ordinary federalism should be eliminated, however, that conclusion
does not tell us in which direction the reconciliation should proceed. As
noted earlier, many scholars criticize some or all of the doctrines of
ordinary federalism on separation of powers grounds. If their proposals
were adopted, then those doctrines would end up looking much more
like the current Erie doctrine. Similarly, some scholars have recast Erie
itself as a separation of powers case, defending it as an embodiment of
judicial self-restraint. 236 That argument, too, implies that we would be
234. Ironically, the question arose only because of the plaintiffs horizontal forum shopping:
Having been kicked out of a California federal court on statute of limitations grounds, Semtek
refiled in Maryland because of its longer statute of limitations. Presumably, it also chose to file in
Maryland stte

conrt bpcsiis

it expected a more favorable riling from a state court fhan from P

federal court on the question of the preclusive effect of the prior federal court ruling. The fact that
the prediction turned out to be wrong does not undermine the point.
235. Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 509 (2001).
236. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997); Clark,
supra note 83, at 1412-22; Kurt T. Lash, The Constitutional Convention of 1937: The Original
Meaning of the New JurisprudentialDeal, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 459 (2001); Thomas W. Merrill,
The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1985); Paul J. Mishkin, Some
FurtherLast Words on Erie-The Thread, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1682 (1974); Young, supra note 7, at
64-82. One commentator labels this the "new myth" of Erie. Green, supra note 2, at 596. To the
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better off revising the ordinary federalism doctrines to look more like
Erie than vice versa.
In this Section, I argue against that approach, and suggest that
ordinary federalism should be emulated because it is correct. It is Erie,
and not the doctrines of ordinary federalism, that should be revised.
At bottom, the debate between those who prefer ordinary
federalism and those who prefer Erie is part of the larger debate, central
to contemporary public law scholarship, about "which institution should
determine the content of the law." 237 The traditional answer-that the
responsibility is shared by the legislature and the judiciary-is under
broad attack from scholars across the political spectrum. 238 The choice
between Eric as anomaly and Erie as model is a choice between the
traditional view and the currently popular view. I cannot expect to
resolve that debate here, so I offer only a basic outline of the most
important arguments in favor of the traditional view.
Those who would limit judicial authority, in the federalism
context as in other contexts, labor under two misconceptions. First, they
believe that it is possible to constrain judicial discretion by the adoption
of either specific doctrines or specific methodologies. Second, they
believe that in the absence of such constraints, what judges do is no
different from what legislatures do: it is all politics, which ought to be
off-limits to judges. Both assumptions are false.
As to the first, Dan Meltzer perhaps put it most succinctly:
"[J]udicial decisionmaking that involves some policymaking discretion
is inevitable."' 23 9 Illustrations abound that neither methodologies nor
doctrines are truly constraining. Purported textualists ignore the plain

extent that these scholars rely on Erie as establishing a precedent against judicial authority, they
fail becausoe the decision itself contains not even a hint that it is basod on separation of powers.
Eric was explicitly and conspicuously a federalism decision. See Sherry, supranote 38, at 145-47;
Peter L. Strauss, The Perilsof Theory, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1568, 1571-73 (2008). A defense of
judicial

eAsraint has to be used to supporL Eric, rathei

thau misusinig E, it to support a doctrhic

of judicial restraint. My argument here is different: I suggest that the Justices in the majority
erred in their consideration of the federalism question because they were distracted by separation
of powers concerns.
237. Merrill, supra note 15, at 727.
238. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CASE AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT (2014); MARK
R. LEVIN, MEN IN BLACK: HOW THE SUPREME COURT IS DESTROYING AMERICA (2006); JOHN 0.
MCGINNIS, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION (2013); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN

RODEO (2005). I have defended the traditional answer on various grounds. See, e.g., Suzanna
Sherry, Liberty's Safety Net, 16 GREEN BAG 2D 467 (2013); Suzanna Sherry, Politicsand Judgment,
70 MO. L. REV. 973 (2005); Sherry, supra note 45.
239. Meltzer, supra note 9, at 43.

2016]

NORMALIZING ERIE

1213

language of the Eleventh Amendment. 240 Purported originalists always
find historical support for their own positions-dueling Supreme Court
opinions relying on historical analysis are far from rare. 241 At the level
of doctrine, if the Court were to explicitly reject the doctrine of implied
preemption, the vagaries of statutory interpretation would allow it to
reach most of the same results under a doctrine of express preemption.
Preemption is not unique in this regard; as the discussion of FAA in the
previous Section suggests, courts often have so many alternative
doctrinal approaches available that they can wiggle out of any
constraints. And the Erie doctrine itself is notorious for the fuzziness of
its distinctions between substance and procedure and its
pronouncements on the "plain meaning" of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Many scholars and judges have made similar or related
points, 24 2 but the bottom line is the same. Scholars who criticize
ordinary federalism doctrines for conferring too much discretion on
judges are mistaken if they think that adoption of their proposals will
curb judicial discretion. They are essentially trying to resurrect
classical formalism. But formalism did not constrain judges, and
neither will these scholars' proposals. 243 And formalist attempts to draw
bright lines are doomed to failure. It is not an accident that ordinary
federalism doctrines ultimately settled on some type of functionalist
balancing test, or that even within the current Erie doctrine there is a
tension between the formalist black-letter law and the functionalist
244
strains that emerge in cases such as Byrd and Gasperini.
The second problem with the critique of ordinary federalism
doctrines is related to the first. Those who urge abandonment of the
doctrines have a view of judging as dichotomous: "[I]f not the heavens,
then the abyss. ' 245 In their eyes, if judges are not umpires calling balls
and strikes, then they must be legislators in black robes. The demand

240. See generally John Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise
ConstitutionalTexts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663 (2004) (criticizing tcxtuali3t Justiccs for their failure to
adhere to the text).
241. Consider, for example, the majority and dissenting opinions in District of Columbia v.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), or Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
242. Prominent examples include AHARON BARAK, JUDICIAL DISCRETION (1989); STEPHEN
BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005); RICHARD H.
FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001); and FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 133.

213. See generally FARBER & SHERRY,cupra note 133 (critiquing modern formalist theories).
944 For q discussion of thnp tpnqions, ee Suu7nnq Sherry, A Pox or Both Yoir Hnyp."Why
the Court Can't Fix the Erie Doctrine, 10 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 173 (2013).
245. Martha Nussbaum, Skepticism About Practical Reason in Literature and the Law, 107
HARV. L. REV. 714, 730 (1994).
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for discretion-curbing doctrines is an attempt to ascend into the
heavens. The fear of unconstrained judicial discretion reflects the fear
of the abyss. The bad news is that the attempt to curb judicial discretion
is impossible. The good news is that it isn't necessary: political judging
is not the only alternative to externally constrained judging. The abyss
is a myth-at least in our modern American judicial system. Many
scholars have canvassed the ways in which discretionary judging-in
both constitutional and nonconstitutional cases-is internally
constrained by various institutional and other factors. 246 Judging is not
wholly divorced from politics, but neither is it politics as practiced in
legislative arenas.
What I have said so far applies to any theory that attempts to
limit judicial discretion based on an argument from separation of
powers. But in the context of unarticulated federal interests, there are
additional, more specific, reasons to prefer ordinary federalism to the
current Erie doctrine. Adjusting the balance between state and federal
power, especially in a regime in which there is overlap between the two,
requires judgment. As Tom Merrill has noted, preemption decisions
(both express and implied) "entail[ ] a discretionary judgment about the
permissible degree of tension between federal and state law, a question
that typically cannot be answered using the tools of statutory
247
interpretation."
In other words, federalism decisions cannot be made mechanical.
It is one thing to argue, for example, that courts should not go beyond
the individual rights listed in the Constitution. It might at least be
possible to do so, although such a rule would nevertheless require
discretionary interpretation of listed rights and in any case would not
be a Constitution that many of us would want to live under. But in the
federalism context, unless we return to a regime in which the powers of
Congress and the states are mutually exclusive, the Court cannot avoid
discretionary line drawing in every case in which state and federal
interests potentially conflict. Whether those interests are articulated or
unarticulated is a matter of degree-as illustrated by the difficulties
the Court has had in the Erie context determining the scope of arguably
248
preemptive Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

246. See, e.g., AHARON BARAK, THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY (2006); BREYER, supra note 242;
DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, JUDGMENT CALLS: PRINCIPLE AND POLITICS IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (2009); RICHARD POSNER, How JUDGES THINK (2008); RICHARD POSNER,
LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2003); DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010);

Paul Freund, An Analysis of JudicialReasoning, in LAw AND PHILOSOPHY 282 (Sidney Hook ed.,
1964); Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633 (1995).
247. Merrill, supra note 15, at 729.
248. See supra note 218; infra text accompanying notes 283-287.
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What, then, would a doctrine governing the law to be applied in
diversity cases look like if it had developed free of distorting concerns
about judicial overreaching, that is, if the Court were to normalize the
Erie doctrine? In other words, once we uncouple Erie from its historical
context, we are free to develop a doctrine that applies ordinary
federalism in the Erie context. In the next Section, I offer a brief sketch
of that potential jurisprudential landscape.
IV. ORDINARY ERIE

A. The Four Principlesof OrdinaryErie
The ordinary federalism doctrines exhibit a common structure.
In each case, state law is ordinarily presumed to operate normally. But
when the law is challenged on the ground that it exceeds state power
by interfering with unarticulated federal interests, the courts evaluate
that claim on its merits. A sufficiently substantial interference with a
sufficiently significant federal interest results in the displacement of
state law.
Under all four doctrines, the displacement of state law is
universal: neither federal nor state courts are permitted to rely on the
state law. A successful dormant commerce clause challenge means that
the state law is invalid and cannot be enforced. A successful preemption
challenge means the same. If unarticulated federal interests counsel
against the use of state preclusion doctrines to govern the effect of a
prior federal judgment, neither federal nor state courts can rely on
those state doctrines. And if the Court decides that unique federal
interests mandate the creation of an enclave of federal common law, the
law thus created is binding on state courts as well.
For the dormant commerce clause and obstacle preemption, the
matter ends there. Once the state law has been invalidated, there is
simply no law to apply. Criminal and civil penalties prescribed by state
law cannot be imposed. Private lawsuits authorized under state law
cannot be brought in any court.
But in the context of preclusion, some law has to govern. It is not
possible to say that because state preclusion law will not dictate the
preclusive effect of an existing federal-court judgment, no law will do
so. Thus in the case of preclusion law, if the courts rely on unarticulated
federal interests to displace state law, they also fashion new federal
common law to take its place. The same is true with regard to the rare
enclaves of federal common law: the Court not only determines that the
matter should not be governed by state law, but also establishes the law
that will govern. This second step is necessitated by the fact that there
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is, as Kevin Clermont reminds us, a "distinction between choosing the
249
applicable law and specifying its content.
Thus there are four important aspects to consider in normalizing
Erie. First, a congruent doctrine governing the substantive law to be
applied in diversity cases should adopt the background presumption of
the applicability of state law. Second, and most crucially, a normalized
Erie doctrine should recognize the courts' authority to overcome the
presumption and displace state law in order to protect unarticulated
federal interests. Third, because diversity cases-like preclusion and
enclave cases and unlike dormant commerce clause or preemption
cases-require the application of some law, courts would have to fashion
federal common law to protect unarticulated federal interests when
necessary. Finally, however, the universal quality of the ordinary
federalism doctrines might not be appropriate: because the Erie
question arises only when parties are in federal court, it might be that
federal common law developed in the limited context of Erie250 should
apply only in federal court.
In this Section, I elaborate how each of these principles of
ordinary federalism would translate into a revised and normalized Erie
doctrine. In other words, I remove the distortion and describe what the
Erie doctrine might look like if the Court had focused (or now focused)
solely on the federalism question, as it did in the other contexts.
1. The Presumption that State Law Applies
Courts should begin by presuming that, in diversity cases, state
substantive law applies. 25 1 They should do so for at least two reasons.
249. Clermont, supra note 107, at 11; see also Nelson, supra note 31, at 39 (opining that once
the Court decides that federal contracts are governed by federal law, the fact that no written
federal law dictates how to interpret federal contracts "surely" does not mean "that federal
contracts arc unintelligible and unenforceable"; courts should supply the necoary federal law).
250. By focusing on the limited context of Erie, I mean specifically to exclude the current
enclaves of federal common law (and any enclaves added in the future), which are, and ohould
remain, binding on state courts.
251. The question of which state's law should apply is beyond the scope of this Article. Many
scholars argue in favor of overruling Mlaxon even in the current Eric regime. See, e.g., William F.
Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 33-35 (1963); Henry M. Hart,
The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 514-15, 541-42 (1954);
Samuel Issacharoff, Settled Expectations in a World of Unsettled Law: Choice of Law After the
Class Action FairnessAct, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1839, 1865-66 (2006); Douglas Laycock, Equal
Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 249, 282 (1992); Richard A. Nagareda, Bootstrappingin Choice of Law After the
Class Action FairnessAct, 74 UMKC L. REV. 661, 678-83 (2006); Mark D. Rosen, Choice-of-Law
as Non-ConstitutionalFederalLaw, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1017, 1020-21 (2015); Linda Silberman, The
Role of Choice of Law in National Class Actions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2001, 2002 (2008). The sort of
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First, the ordinary federalism doctrines accommodate state and
federal interests by adopting such a presumption. Because my
argument rests primarily on the incongruity between Erie and ordinary
federalism, my solution is to make Erie look more like the other
doctrines. The same presumption should therefore apply. 252 Requiring
congruity is not mere formalism, however. The adoption of a
presumption in favor of the operation of state law makes sense for all
the doctrines that address the question of unarticulated federal
interests. A presumption one way or the other is efficient (the stronger
the presumption, the more efficient). And because we are talking about
unarticulated interests, we should presume that if Congress has not
chosen to explicitly protect the interest, it is more likely than not that
the interest is unworthy of judicial protection.
Second, for run-of-the-mill cases, the current Erie doctrine
works. Courts are familiar with the doctrine and apply it routinely and
often with little difficulty. We do not need a federal common law to
govern automobile accidents, property disputes, and the like. It would
be more burdensome for federal courts to have to develop parallel
federal common-law doctrines. Diversity jurisdiction is burdensome
enough: as Justice Frankfurter noted, "An Act for the elimination of
diversity jurisdiction could fairly be called an Act for the relief of the
federal courts." 253 Most federal courts told to construct a federal
common law of, say, negligence, would probably choose to adopt state
law anyway. I am already suggesting a radical change in the doctrinefrom a near-universal mandate to a rebuttable presumption-and there
is no need to throw the baby out with the bathwater.
2. Overcoming the Presumption:
Identifying Unarticulated Federal Interests
Where the current Erie doctrine goes wrong-and where it
diverges from ordinary federalism-is in its insistence that state
balancing that I advocate for substantive law might yield a conclusion that there is a strong federal
interest in uniform choice-of-law rules, as many of these scholars have urged.
252. There is some dispute in the literature about how courts use state law under current
doctrines: whether state law is applied,adopted, or incorporated.See, e.g., Erbsen, supra note 110,
at 586-87; Michael Steven Green, The Twin Aims of Erie, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1865, 1869-71,
1886 (2013); Roosevelt, supra note 110, at 14-15. That debate is irrelevant to my thesis; I use the
term "presumption" to encompass all three possibilities.
253. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 651 (1949); see also Larry
Kramer, Diversity Jurisdiction, 1990 BYU L. REV. 97 (1990) (urging abolition of diversity
jurisdiction); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Aboli3hing Diversity Jurisdiction:Positive Side Effects and
Potential for FurtherReform, 92 HARV. L. REV. 963 (1979) (same); Dolores K. Sloviter, A Federal
Judge Views Diversity Jurisdiction Through the Lens of Federalism, 78 VA. L. REV. 1671 (1992)
(same).
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substantive law must apply unless Congress has explicitly dictated
otherwise. Under the doctrines of ordinary federalism, the presumption
that state law applies can be overcome if the Court finds that
application of state law would interfere with federal interests that are
unarticulated by Congress. The judiciary, in other words, engages in an
open-ended balancing process to determine whether state law should
apply.
I suggest that in Erie cases, courts should similarly be able to
overcome the presumption by reference to unarticulated, as well as
articulated, federal interests. And it should not require the
extraordinary circumstances that currently underlie the enclaves of
federal common law.
Suggesting that the Court has power to identify and protect
federal interests unarticulated by Congress raises two related
questions, both of which can be answered by reference to existing
doctrines. First, how should courts identify unarticulated federal
interests triggering the application of federal common law? Second, how
strong is the presumption in favor of state law?
On the first question, the Court has had little trouble identifying
such interests in the context of the enclaves of federal common law. It
could do so as well in Erie cases. It has not done so, however, because it
views the line of cases from Hinderlider to Boyle as isolated and
disfavored exceptions to the Erie doctrine: Erie demands slavish
adherence to state law, and the Court creates narrow exceptions to it
by adding categories of federal interests piecemeal by analogy to
existing categories. I am suggesting instead that the Court adopt an
overarching standard applicable in both the enclave cases and more
run-of-the-mill Erie cases, allowing judges in all Erie cases to evaluate
the effect of state law on federal interests. 254 Identifying unarticulated
federal interests would work the same way in both contexts.
Additionally, there is precedent for judicial recognition of
unarticulated federal interests even within the current Erie doctrine.
In Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative,25 5 the Court relied
on-and then immediately abandoned-a standard analogous to the

254. Wendy Perdue has also advocated aligning Erie and the federal common-law cases. See
Perdue, supra note 107. But her suggestion differs from mine in two important and related ways.
First, her argument is internal to Erie and the common-law cases and thus does not view it as part
of the general question of judicial authority to protet unarticulated federal interests. Second, she
suggests extending the two-step analysis of the common-law cases to Eric questions; my argument
in this Article is that the cognate doctrines already provide the answer to the first step there is
power in the federal courts to create common law whenever unarticulated federal interests are at
stake.
255. 356 U.S. 525 (1958), discussed supra,note 107.
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approach I am suggesting. In Byrd, the Court struggled with whether
to apply, in a diversity case, a state law that gave a particular disputed
factual question to a judge rather than a jury. The Court first
determined that the Seventh Amendment did not mandate a jury trial,
and that the allocation to a judge rather than a jury might change the
outcome of the case (and thus that under existing precedent, state law
should apply). But the Court went on to suggest that "the federal policy
favoring jury decisions of disputed fact" was an "affirmative
countervailing consideration" that might dictate application of federal
law. 256 The Court has never again referred to "countervailing
considerations" that trump an otherwise applicable state law, and Byrd
stands as an enigmatic and inexplicable case. Translating
"countervailing considerations" as "unarticulated federal interests,"
however, makes sense out of Byrd.
Having explained Byrd, I would expand it to all legal issues in
diversity cases rather than limiting it to cases in which the state law
straddles the line between substance and procedure. And rather than
characterizing it, as Byrd also did, as a test unique to Erie situations, I
would simply identify it as an aspect of ordinary federalism.
Balancing tests reign throughout the legal landscape, and there
no
reason
to doubt the courts' ability to apply a balancing test in this
is
area as they do in so many others. In particular, balancing tests are
often used in horizontal choice-of-law decisions; it makes some sense to
apply them as well in the context of the Erie doctrine's vertical choice25 7
of-law context.
As for the strength of the presumption in favor of state law, it
probably does not make much difference. The Court has over time
adopted varying levels of presumption in the dormant commerce clause
and obstacle preemption contexts, and it has neither made the results
predictable nor prevented the Justices from disagreeing with one
another. Nor has attempting to answer what is essentially a difficult
question of balancing individual and government interests by setting
an artificial level of scrutiny produced much certainty in the Equal
258
Protection context.
Courts are experienced at identifying competing interests and
balancing them to determine which should prevail. Doing so in the
context of deciding whether unarticulated federal interests should

256. Id. at 537-38.
257. See Joscph P. Baucr, The Eric Doctrine Revisited: How a Conflicts Perspective Can Aid
the Analysis, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1235, 1262-81 (1999).
258. See Suzanna Sherry, Selective JudicialActivism: Defending Carolene Products, 14 GEO.
(forthcoming 2016).
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y -
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displace the presumption that state law governs in diversity cases does
not present any special difficulties.
3. Fashioning Federal Common Law
If a federal court determines that the application of state law
would interfere with unarticulated federal interests, then federal law
will apply. By definition, of course, in an Erie case there is no applicable
(substantive) federal statutory law, so the courts will have to create
federal common law. In one sense, this should make my suggested
revision of the Erie doctrine less controversial than existing doctrines
of preemption. As one commentator has noted, a serious negative
consequence of a holding of preemption-at least in the context of tort
claims-is that tort victims "may be left without recourse to a damages
remedy" because federal law does not provide one. 25 9 My revised Erie
doctrine offers an alternative to simple preemption: courts can instead
view it as a situation in which the need to protect unarticulated federal
interests requires the judicial substitution of federal remedies for state
remedies.
That federal courts will, under my theory, have to develop
federal common-law doctrines to govern areas in which federal law
should apply, then, is a benefit rather than a disadvantage. And, again,
it is not a novel task for federal courts. They already fashion commonlaw doctrines to govern the preclusive effect of federal-court judgments
in both diversity and federal-question cases. They develop and apply
common law in the context of the existing enclaves identified by the
Supreme Court as implicating unique federal interests. They use
common-law methods to fill gaps when the positive law runs out, for
example in the Rules of Evidence and federal antitrust statutes. Even
within diversity jurisdiction, federal common law sometimes governs:
lower courts have held, for example, that federal common law governs
259. Betsy J. Grey, Make CongressSpeak Clearly:FederalPreemption of State Tort Remedies,
77 B.U. L. REV. 559, 562 (1997); see also Jonathan Remy Nash, Null Preemption, 85 NOTRE DAME
1, REV. 1015 (2010) (suggesting that preemption of state law without substituting federal law
ought to be rare); David C Vladeck, Preemption and Regulatory Failure Risks, in PREEMPTION
CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM'S CORE QUESTION, supra note 174, at 54-

56 (discussing the need for tort remedies to supplement a regulatory regime). As one commentator
on the AALS Federal Courts Section listserv described current law, "when the US Supreme Court
doesn't like state law, they federalize it. Examples: defamation, punitive damages, land use
conditions, products liability (preemption)." Posting of Jack M. Boermann, boormann@bu.odu, to
SECTFD.aals@lists.aals.org (June 11, 2015) (on file with author); see also Jack M. Beermann, The
Supreme Common Law Court of the United States, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 119, 152-54 (2008)
(making a similar point). Using preemption to "federalize" some torts just oliminates the liability;
my approach would instead retain liability but keep it uniform.
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the determination of domicile for purposes of invoking diversity
2 60
jurisdiction in the first place.
As for the content of that common law, it would be almost
oxymoronic to say much. As I am recommending a common-law
approach to the Erie question, it behooves me to allow common-law
development of the idea. I therefore leave to the federal judiciary to
develop-and future scholars to evaluate--common-law doctrines
261
adequate to the task of protecting unarticulated federal interests.
Finally, a normalized Erie doctrine should also mirror ordinary
federalism with regard to the relationship between the law developed
by courts and the law enacted by Congress. In ordinary federalism
cases, Congress can always override a judicial determination that
unarticulated federal interests are at stake. Congress can enact laws
specifying that particular state laws do not interfere with interstate
commerce, or are not preempted. It can pass legislation providing that
state, rather than federal, law applies in preclusion cases or in the
enclaves of federal common law. It can also enact new federal statutory
law to apply (in any situation of ordinary federalism) if it agrees that
federal law should govern but disagrees with the particular commonlaw doctrines established by the courts. And so it should be in diversity
cases. Even if the courts determine that an interest in, say, an
integrated national market for consumer goods requires the
development of federal common law, Congress can override that
determination by passing a law specifying that state law applies in such
cases. 262 Or Congress could choose to confer the authority to establish
federal law on a federal agency rather than the federal (or state) courts.
The current Erie doctrine requires Congress to move first: if a
state law interferes with federal interests, Congress has to notice,
decide to act, choose that problem above all the others that it grapples
with, and then overcome political barriers to craft and pass a responsive
statute. Under a normalized Erie doctrine, the courts would tee up the
issue for Congress. As Jonathan Siegel has noted in a slightly different
context, courts have several advantages over Congress that allow them
260. See, e.g., Bower v. Egyptair Airlines Co., 731 F.3d 85, 91 (1st Cir. 2013); Horton v. Bank
One, N.A., 387 F.3d 426, 435 (5th Cir. 2004); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. 174 Acres of Land, 193 F.3d
944, 946 (8th Cir. 1999); Pacho v. Enter. Rent-a-Car, 510 F. Supp. 2d 331, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). For
other examples, see Tidmarsh & Murray, supra note 22, at 590-92.
261. One question that will need an answer is the basio on which the courts should make (or
the sources from which they should draw in making) federal common law. How free-wheeling
should they be? See, e.g., Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., State Courts and the Making of Federal Common
Law, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 825 (2005); Nelson, supra note 31.
262. In other words, Congress could enact a clearer (and, if it so desired, more specific)
substitute for the Rules of Decision Act.
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to be more focused, transparent, and responsive. 263 Allowing the
judiciary and the legislature to work together in the way that my
revised Erie doctrine does is therefore efficient.
4. A Bifurcated Approach
The question of the governing law in diversity cases raises one
additional question, not present in the context of most ordinary
federalism cases. For cases arising under the dormant commerce clause,
obstacle preemption, and the preclusive effect of federal-court
judgments, the substantive claim or defense is itself federal. (The
enclave cases are different; I address them separately.) Often, a party
who would otherwise be subject to state law brings a declaratory or
injunctive action in federal court, asking the court to invalidate the
state law as preempted or unconstitutional. 26 4 Sometimes a party who
is sued in state court raises preemption or unconstitutionality as a
265
defense, asking the court to dismiss the complaint or indictment.
Either way, the party's substantive claim or defense is federal.
Similarly, as the Court has recognized since Dupasseur,the claim that
a prior federal-court judgment precludes suit is itself a substantive
federal defense whether raised in federal or state court.
When the question is the law that governs in diversity cases (and
the enclaves of federal common law), however, the situation is different.
There is no substantive federal claim; even if the court decides that
unarticulated federal interests warrant the development of, say, a
federal law of products liability, no plaintiff could file a federal tort
claim based on a defective product. 266 The claim would still arise under
state law, and would be brought in federal court only on the basis of
diversity of citizenship. Nor could a potential defendant bring an
anticipatory suit in federal court demanding that in all products
liability cases the state courts apply federal common law, the way a
potential defendant brings an anticipatory suit seeking an injunction
against enforcement of a state law. The sole substantive claim is under

263. Jonathan R. Siegel, The Institutional Case for JudicialReview, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1147,
1191-94 (2012).
264. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981); Perez v. Campbell,
402 U.S. 637 (1971); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Co., 331 U.S. 218 (1947); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
265. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011); Wyeth v. Levine, 555
U.S. 555 (2009); Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299 (1851).
266. One might perhaps make an argument that once a common law of federal products
liability (or whatever) has been developed, the courts ought to create a cause of action under that
body of law as well. That possibility is beyond the scopc of this Article.
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state law, and it is only the diversity of citizenship that gives the federal
court jurisdiction in the first place.
Nor is there a federal "defense" of the sort that the doctrines of
preclusion, preemption, and unconstitutionality offer. The argument
under my revised Erie doctrine is not that federal law eliminates the
claim-that is, that it should be dismissed-but that the court's
adjudication of the claim should follow a different path. That is more
akin to a defendant arguing that plaintiff has mistaken the meaning of
the governing law: under a true interpretation of the law, the defendant
is arguing, the court's legal or factual inquiry will be different from the
one plaintiff suggests.
Because the claim itself arises under state law, the question is
not whether to allow the claim but how to decide it. This choice-of-law
decision is, as one scholar has noted, similar to other "internal rules of
the federal government": it is "intra-judicial law, designed by federal
judges to address peculiar problems that arise in their statutorily
ordained, constitutionally authorized job." 267 There is thus no a priori
reason to assume that state and federal courts must decide the claim
the same way; it is only the Erie doctrine itself that forces us to that
conclusion. And it is because of Eriethat the enclave cases-which grew
out of the Erie doctrine's closing off of the ordinary pattern of creating
federal common law to govern only in federal court-hold that the
limited common law that remains after Erie must apply in both state
and federal court.
Indeed, both before and after Erie different courts could decide
exactly the same claim differently. Under Swift, state courts were not
bound to follow Supreme Court decisions (much less lower federal court
decisions) on general federal common law. 268 A few years after Swift, a
New York court declined to follow its substantive holding. 269 Even
under Erie, large gaps exist. State courts are not bound to follow federal
courts' "Erie guesses" as to the content of state law. Nor is there a
horizontal equivalent of the Erie doctrine: state courts are not obliged
to apply the law of a sister state even to suits arising from events in
that sister state. 2 70 Conversely, a court in state A can use the law of

267. Craig Green, Erie and Problems of ConstitutionalStructure, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 661, 66768 (2008).
268. See Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Federal Common Law of Nations,
109 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 77 (2009); Fletcher, supra note 74, at 1561; Strauss, supra note 236, at
1582-88; Weinstein, supra note 74, at 294 n.448.
269. Stalker v. McDonald, 6 Hill 93 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843).
270. See Michaol Stovon Groon, Horizontal Erio and the Presumption of Forum Law, 109
MICH. L. REV. 1237 (2011).
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state B even in a situation in which state B would not use its own law. 27 1
There is also a split in the circuits about whether Erie requires federal
courts, in attempting to divine how a state court would interpret a state
statute, to follow state rules of statutory interpretation. 272 Once we
remove the blinders imposed by Erie, and see the variety of legal
circumstances in which different courts apply different law to the same
claim, we can see that state courts should not necessarily be bound to
apply federal common law (outside the established enclaves) to state
claims.
Thus, had the Erie doctrine developed naturally, uninfluenced
by separation of powers concerns, the Court might not have baldly
declared that "[t]here is no federal general common law."273 Instead, it
might have accommodated state and federal interests by limiting both
the circumstances calling for, and the reach of, federal common law.
Even the enclave cases might have developed much as they did: in most
circumstances, there is no particular need for universal federal common
law, but in a few exceptional cases there is. An undistorted Erie
doctrine, in other words, might allow federal courts to create federal
common law in order to protect unarticulated federal interests, but also
hold that absent extraordinary circumstances such federal common law
binds only federal courts.
In the Swift era, such a bifurcation caused undesirable forumshopping, but that is not a serious objection, for two reasons. 274 First, I

271. See Green, supra note 58, at 873. Green discusses Rhee v. Combined Enterprises, Inc.,
536 A.2d 1197 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988), which applied New Jersey law on interspousal suits to a
suit between a Maryland husband and wife involved in an accident in New Jersey, The Maryland
court applied New Jersey law even though New Jersey had previously held that its interspousal
law should not be applied to nondomiciliaries involved in New Jersey accidents. Veazey v.
Doremus, 510 A.2d 1187 (N.J. 1986); see also Michael Steven Green, Erie's Suppressed Premise,
95 MINN, L REV. 1111 1163, n.205 (2011) (describing a similar result in a Georgia court); ef. Green,
supra note 252, at 1866-67, 1882, 1887-88 (noting that the Court in Guaranty Trust applied the
state -statute of limitations without examining whether state courts would rule that the state
statute of limitations applied in non-state courts).
272. See Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation:Methodology as 'Law "and the
Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1901 (2011) ("Neither the federal nor the state courts have any
consistent or well articulated approach to the question of whether they are required to apply one
another's interpretive methodologies to one another's statuies.").
273. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
274. Assuming that it is even a problem: one scholar suggests that forum-shopping is not
inherently evil. Alan M. Trammell, Toil and Trouble: How the Erie Doctrine Became Structurally
Incoherent (and How Congress Can Fix It), 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3249, 3272-77 (2014). Another
argues that giving plaintiffs an ability to forum shop can be a good thing. Erwin Chemerinsky,
Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. REV. 233 (1988). For
an interesting and novel defense of Erie as a way to prevent forum shopping in order to prevent
federal courts from "increas[ing] their share of the market in dispute resolution through what
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am not advocating the application of federal law across the board, as
occurred in the years after Swift; I expect there are a fairly limited
number of areas in which unarticulated federal interests counsel the
application of federal common law, especially given the presumption
against displacement of state law. Opportunities for forum-shopping
would be concomitantly limited. Second, Erie did not eliminate-or even
significantly reduce-forum-shopping. Erie merely traded vertical
forum-shopping for horizontal forum-shopping. Parties are now
arguably indifferent as between state and federal courts, 275 but they
care about which state the court sits in regardless of whether that court
is state or federal.
While freeing state courts from the obligation to follow federal
common law may seem counterintuitive, it is neither novel nor
necessarily detrimental to our litigation regime. And it means that my
suggested normalization of the Erie doctrine is less intrusive on state
prerogatives than are the other doctrines of ordinary federalism. Under
the other doctrines, courts will presume that state laws are valid and
operational, and will displace those laws only where necessary to
protect unarticulated federal interests. In those contexts, that
displacement is final and universal: states cannot salvage whatever
policy they hoped to achieve by their laws. But under my proposed new
Erie doctrine, states are still free to apply their own law in their own
courts. It is only when state law negatively affects both unarticulated
federal interests and citizens of other states 276 that federal common law
will govern.
B. The Benefits of Normalizing Erie
In addition to closing the gap between Erie and the ordinary
federalism doctrines, normalizing the Erie doctrine closes four other
gaps. First, it makes federal legislative and judicial power

might be called judicial product differentiation," see Mark Moller, The Checko and Balances of
Forum Shopping, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 107, 110 (2012).
275. The choice of state or federal court -till matters in some cases. For example, after Shady
Grove OrthopedicAssociates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010), a case seeking
statutory damages can be certified as a clasp action in a New York federal court but not in a New
York state court. As one might expect, the Shady Grove decision led to "large shifts in the patterns
of original filings and removals in federal courts in New York." William H.J. Hubbard, An
Empirical Study of the Effect of Shady Grove v. Allstate on Forum Shopping in the New York
Courts, 10 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 151, 151 (2013).
276. Or, in the case of supplemental jurisdiction, when state law overlaps with federal causes
of action.
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coextensive. 277 Second, it allows state and federal courts to exercise the
same authority to create and apply common law. 278 Ironically, Erie itself
simultaneously expanded the reach of state judge-made law and
contracted the scope of federal judge-made law. Third, my revised Erie
doctrine makes the vertical choice-of-law decision look much more like
typical horizontal choice-of-law decisions that rely on some form of
balancing test. 279 Finally, using a functionalist rather than formalist
approach for Erie questions is more consistent with the approach
adopted by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. Those Rules
famously substituted the freewheeling functionalism of suits at equity
for the arcane procedural formalism that had come to dominate suits at
law. 280 If nothing else, Rule 1, calling for the Rules to be used to "secure
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination" of every case, makes
the point.
Normalizing Erie also resolves two tensions within the current
Erie doctrine. First, as noted earlier, there is a great deal of dispute
about the place of Byrd v. Blue Ridge Electric Rural Electrical
Cooperative28 1 in modern Erie jurisprudence. Viewing Erie as an
ordinary federalism question resolves that dispute. Byrd becomes an
ordinary case in which unarticulated federal interests trump state
law. 28 2 And recognizing the conduct of jury trials as an unarticulated
federal interest also resolves any ancillary questions, such as how to
conduct voir dire or whether to dismiss a juror for cause, that might
otherwise be difficult to resolve under the current scheme that requires
the judge to determine whether there is a codified federal rule on point,
and, if not, whether applying federal common law (or customary
practice) is likely to encourage forum-shopping or cause inequities.
Second, my revised Erie doctrine could resolve what has become
the most difficult question under the current doctrine: what to do about
a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure that seems to conflict with
substantive state policies in a diversity case. In case after case, the
277. See Field, supra note 38, at 923-27; Mishkin, supra note 236; Henry P. Monaghan,
Foreword: ConstitutionalCommon Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8-9 n.42 (1975); Weinberg, supra note
196, at 806.
278. See Alfred Hill, The Law-Making Powerof the Federal Courts: ConstitutionalPreemption,
67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024 (1967).
279. See LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS 47-84 (2d ed. 1995); see also Roosevelt, supra
note 110 (suggesting that Erie questions should be approached from a particular choice-of-law
perspective).
280. See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The FederalRules of Civil
Procedure in HistoricalPerspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987).
281. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
282. See supra text accompanying notes 255-257.
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Court has wavered between interpreting a federal Rule narrowly to
allow room for the operation of state policy, and interpreting the Rule
more broadly and thus displacing state policy. 28 3 In neither situation
does the Court make explicit that what it is doing is balancing some
unarticulated federal interest in the Rule-or in the uniformity of
federal litigation-against the state interference with that interest.
The problem becomes even worse when we examine the cases in
which the federal Rule gives way. In those cases, some Rules apply
differently depending on whether the case is brought under diversity or
federal question jurisdiction and, in diversity cases, on which state's
law applies.
For example, Rule 3 provides that "[a] civil action is commenced
by filing a complaint with the court." The Court has interpreted Rule 3
to mean, as a general matter, that the statute of limitations is tolled
upon filing.28 4 But the law in some states is that the statute of
limitations is not tolled until the complaint is actually served on the
defendant. In diversity actions in which the law of one of those states
applies, the Court has said that state law governs: the statute of
limitations is not tolled by mere filing. 28 5 Thus the plain language of
Rule 3 means different things in different lawsuits. A similar problem
has divided lower courts interpreting Rule 8's requirement that a
complaint contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief." Some states add additional
requirements for particular lawsuits: for example, some states require
in malpractice cases a "certificate of merit" from a licensed professional.
Some lower federal courts require the certificate in malpractice cases
governed by the law of one of those states, and others do not. 28 6 And
even if the lower courts uniformly required such a certificate, Rule 8
would still be interpreted differently depending on which state's law
applied.
As it stands, courts analyze these sorts of questions by asking
'28 7
whether the state rule "is in direct conflict with the Federal Rule.
But that question is nonsensical once the meaning of the Federal Rule
has been determined. If a court interprets the Federal Rule in a federalquestion case (or in a diversity case without a contrary state law) to say
283. For a description of the cases, see Sherry, supra note 244, at 180-89.
284. West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35 (1987).
285. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S 740 (1980); Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer &
Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
286. Compare, e.g., Liggon-Redding v. Estate of Sugarman, 659 F.3d 258 (3d Cir. 2011)
(certificate required), with, e.g., Braddock v. Orlando Reg'l Health Care Sys., Inc., 881 F. Supp.
580 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (no certificate required).
287. Walker, 446 U.S. at 749.
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one thing, how can that Rule not be in "direct conflict" with a state law
that says the opposite?
It would make much more sense to ask whether, in the case of
the particular Rule at issue, there is a sufficiently strong unarticulated
federal interest in the Rule itself or in applying it uniformly. If so, then
the state rule is displaced in diversity suits in federal court. If not, then
the court reverts to the background presumption that state law applies.
Thus my revised Erie doctrine solves a practical problem that arises
frequently in federal courts.
CONCLUSION
Some scholars have argued that the Erie doctrine is flawed and
needs repair. A few would even abolish it. Others defend it vigorously.
The critics have mostly focused their attention on inconsistencies
within the Erie doctrine or on practical problems in its application. Both
critics and defenders have sometimes couched their discussion in terms
of general theories of separation of powers or federalism.
But neither critics nor defenders of Erie have recognized that the
doctrine is fundamentally at odds with the rest of the Supreme Court's
federalism jurisprudence. In at least four other contexts, the Supreme
Court accommodates state and federal interests by presuming that
state law applies while nevertheless reserving to the federal judiciary
the authority to protect federal interests. And in those ordinary
federalism contexts-unlike under the Erie doctrine-the Court does
not insist on congressional codification as a prerequisite for judicial
action. Under the dormant commerce clause, implied preemption
doctrines, doctrines of preclusion, and the enclaves of federal common
law, federal courts are free to protect federal interests that Congress
has not protected or articulated. It is only the Erie doctrine that draws
a sharp and unjustified distinction between codified and uncodified-or
articulated and unarticulated-federal interests.
In this Article, I identify and describe this anomaly, and
attribute it to the historical circumstances in which the Erie doctrine
developed. I contend that those historical circumstances distracted the
Court's attention, preventing it from recognizing that the issue in Erie
is the same as that in ordinary federalism cases. This lack of focus
distorted the Court's response in Erie. Finally, I provide a brief sketch
of what an undistorted Erie doctrine-Erie normalized, as it weremight look like.
Although the law truly is a seamless web, sometimes that web
develops large and ugly holes. History, context, and precedent can blind
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us to those holes. But when we see them, we should patch them.
Normalizing the Erie doctrine is a long overdue repair.

